First of all, apologies for the recent lack of publications. I know it’s been a little quiet around here.

The good news is that I’ve been working behind the scenes on a new version of the blog, which should be released in the next few days.

For current readers and subscribers, nothing will change — your access and experience will remain the same. But there are some exciting things coming.

I already have new analysis from new companies in the pipeline, as well as the long-awaited LVMH Series, which I know some of you have been waiting for.

The goal is to deliver more value and more analysis, covering more companies and sharing more tools like financial models, etc.

More soon.

Stay tuned!

Best,

Phil

Introduction

Antin reported earnings on September 9th, and again, the company disappointed. The new fundraising cycle keeps delaying, and the company is loosing credibility as it’s not meeting the expectations. It’s disappointing as current expectations might not be met.

The main reason was the delay of the activation of Mid Cap II, a fund currently in fundraising, that has been delayed until end of the year. Management cited that the main reason behind this delay is that they want to have one investment ready to maximize efficiency for LPs.

Fundraising cycle keeps delaying as the company is not transacting as it expected.

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1. Mid Cap Fund II has been delayed until end of the year

While this is not the end of the world, it’s disappointing because Antin needs to start delivering in the fundraising front.

Mid Cap II’s activation slipped from Q2 to Q4 2026 because Antin ties fund activation to the fund’s first investment, and that first deal hasn’t happened yet.

This has one consequence: management fees will not be perceived until the fund is activated. However, for long-term investors, a delay of two quarters of a small fraction of management fees is not a big issue.

My reading:

1. Antin is not delivering on investments and divestments — Current environment has created distortions that are delaying the investment and divestment activity.

2. Investors are willing to invest in Antin’s funds, but are requiring a more efficient approach as investments are taking longer than expected for the Fund VI, and distributions are also delaying (Mid Cap I has not returned any capital yet to investors).

If management expects activation by Q4 2026, means that they currently have something in the pipeline at and advanced stage. Once the fund is activated we will know the target size and the current appetite for Antin’s funds.

The delay itself is not the issue, but rather the underlying messages.

2. Flagship VI will likely be delayed, unless company deploys capital fast

Antin still needs to deliver on two fronts to ensure they can raise the Flagship Fund VI:

1. Return capital to LPs from Fund III

2. Finalize the investments of Fund V (between 2 and 3 remaining).

Returning capital to investors will likely take several quarters, and recent performance is being quite weak

Antin reported the following slide, in which we can see that there are no ongoing processes for Fund III. The company will need to extend the life of the fund, which is a 2016 vintage. Extending the life of a fund is not a positive sign.

The longer the period, the more difficult to achieve he targeted IRRs. Fore reference, Antin reported gross multiples of 2.0x and 2.4x, for Idex and Solvtrans, respectively. However, these investments were made in 2018 leading to very modest IRRs between 9-12%.

The fund still holds CityFibre, FirstLight Fiber, Elanta and Kisimul. There are not ongoing processes according to the management, and press reports point to FirstLight Fiber as the potential next candidate.

Since the IPO in 2021, the company has made 7 exits, which represents around 1.4 exits per year. If teams keep that pace, it is unlikely we see a full divestment in 2027.

This adds even more pressure to the performance of the fund. IRRs are affected by timing, and investors know when there is timing pressures, with the risk of Antin becoming a forced seller.

Investment activity has been stronger than divestments, although it will be challenging to meet the 2027 target

The company has done around 2 investments per year. Antin needs to invest in 2-3 companies before the next fund can be launched.

Management targets 2027 for fund activation, but this seems tight, considering all the ongoing activity. After all the delays, 2028 seems the right year to forecast a more conservative scenario.

After hearing the Investor’s call, management didn’t provided a solid commitment to a Fund VI in 2027, rather citing it’s the base case.

3. Flagship Strategy is under severe pressure

Management adjusted the valuation of Fund III from 1.9x to 1.7x, reducing expectations form “Above plan” to “On plan”. More over, Fund III-B has been reduced from 1.7x gross MOIC “On Plan” to 1.4x “Below plan”.

The strategy is under severe pressure:

• Fund III will need to extend the life of the fund, which creates frictions with LPs as the company is not returning capital back, and every year beyond the investment horizon impacts the IRR

• Fund III-B while likely be a fund underperforming the strategy, while Fund III will likely not meet the returns of Fund I and Fund II of 2.5x and 2.6x MOIC, respectively.

• Fund IV is likely to start divestments. It’s a 2019 vintage, so starting now is slightly below the plan, but they can still have the strategy fully diverted by 2029.

• Flagship V, a 2022 vintage and has deployed €3.6bn of the €10.2bn commitments. This creates frictions with LPs as they have allocated funds to this strategy, while not receiving capital calls.

The strategy will likely face difficulties during the next fundraising cycle. This is affecting the entire industry. Other PE firms are creating continuation funds, which in my opinion, are a worst outcome for investors.

Antin did it with Fund III-B in 2020 and the results are clear, it’s the worst performer of all its funds.

The main issue is the delay in investing, which implicitly affects the future fundraising period of the next two funds:

• For Fund VI, it implies a delay in future fundraising of 1-2 years

• But, it will also impact Fund VII, as the current fund will take longer to divest.

It seems the company found its sweet spot in the mid cap fund, deploying significant capital in the last years, but it’s not happening with fund VI, which 4 years after inception, it has just deployed 60% of the committed capital.

4. Forget about the first carried interest from Fund III-B

Fund III-B is below target, which means that is highly unlikely shareholders will benefit from the first carried interest.

While this has not a material impact on valuation, we feel that taking the most conservative approach with carried interest is the right approach and we are adjusting some of the future targets considering the delays in Fund V.

While management still reports €500 million of potential carried interest, I’m slightly adjusting the figures to remain conservative and excluding any carried interest from Fund III-B.

5. Midcap Strategy: Should we be worried?

The launch of Mid Cap II has been delayed to the end of the year. Management cited that wants to maximize efficiency to LPs by making coincide the fund activation with the first investment.

Management cited that they have commitments held in escrow, but didn’t provide further details on fundraising activity.

This adds some uncertainty, but the outcome is likely to be seen by the end of the year. What seems clear is that investors are focusing on deployment times and want to avoid having their funds committed through longer periods.

6. Have Operating Expenses gone too far?

When CIC's Arnaud Palliez asked whether they'd launch cost-control measures given the fund delay, Walid was explicit that the delay "should not trigger any cost actions." The framing was that Antin has spent recent years building a scalable platform (investment teams, specialist functions, fundraising, operations), so cost growth is now naturally decelerating and operating leverage is starting to show — but they'll keep investing ahead of the next fundraising cycle.

Since the IPO, the headcount has nearly doubled, with personnel expenses increasing significantly each year. This has not been followed by a rise in management fees from fundraising, eroding margins over time.

While too soon to judge this, there is currently a misalignment between size of the teams and the size of the assets under management.

In a year with no exceptional developments, personnel expenses grew by +6.9%.

7. During September 15^th, multiple partners sold shares, partly increasing the liquidity of the stock

Adding to this weak performance, during September 15 a group of current and former partners placed a large block of shares at a material discount to the prior market price.

• The selling group placed 5.0 million Antin ordinary shares, equal to roughly 2.8% of the company’s share capital.

• The shares were sold through an accelerated bookbuild at €7.18 per share, for gross proceeds of about €35.9 million.

• Antin had closed the preceding session at €7.98, so the placement price represented a 10.03% discount to the prior close.

• In response, the listed shares traded around €7.54–€7.55, down 5.5% intraday.

It’s a bad timing, and a bad signal, considering share price it’s at historical lows. A 10% discount signals that there is no appetite for Antin — for whatever the reason.

• Some members of the Executive Committee, including Alain Rauscher, Chairman and CEO, purchased c.1.4 million shares at the offering price.

• Antin purchased c.0.7 million of its own shares at the offering price, pursuant to its share buyback program authorized by Antin’s shareholders at the Annual General Meeting of 10 June 2026.

The Sale follows the second expiry of the IPO lock-up, during which 25% of the shares held by the concert of partners were released. The Sellers and the members of the Executive Committee who placed an order in the Sale have agreed to an additional 90-day lock-up, subject to certain customary exception

This added extra pressure to the stock price, which is at historical lows.

8. Forecasting the future is more challenging than ever

On one side, we see headcount increasing in the last years, with the message that the company is preparing for a new cycle of growth.

On the other hand, investment activity is weak and might impact the future fundraising cycle.

Overall, fundraising activity is positive in the market, and firms are raising more funds than in past years.

However, the market is clearly pricing a deterioration of Antin’s business, and frankly, the company is not delivering to contradict this argument.

9. Market is anticipating a negative scenario with a massive multiple re-rating over the last years

Antin stock keeps declining, which raises the question of whether this is a value trap or not.

As seen in the chart below, stock performance is not matching the evolution of fundamentals of the company. Recent performance is driven by a huge multiple re-rating.

Consensus analysts believe that the company will earn €100m during the next year, and €150m in 2028. However, what the market is saying to us is that this company is no longer a high quality private equity firm.

There are factors that impact this view:

• First, Antin is a small company in the stock market, mainly due to low liquidity. With c.16% of free float and €1.3bn of market cap, this means that only €200 million is available.

• This illiquidity generates high volatility — for the good (in 2021) and the bad (right now).

10. At current valuation investors get a c.9-10% dividend yield

Dividend at €0.7 per share is confirmed — at least for this year representing a dividend yield of 9-10%.

But, depending on the outcome of the fundraising cycle of the next 2-3 years, this dividend might not be sustainable.

There are too many uncertainties, and either the market has gone too far, or EPS is expected to decrease by 50% following the next fundraising cycle.

11. At this stage, we need to model 3 different scenarios to quantify the outcome

I build three different cases:

• Conservative scenario: the company faces 5-year cycles, compared to 3-4 years historically which lead to a new fund every 6 years; lower fund size compared to current funds; No future NextGen funds.

• Base case: Fund life cycles moderate and company launches new funds every 5 years (4 years to invest a fund), and fund size is maintained across the 3 strategies

• Aggressive case: Same as base case but with an improvement in fundraising (+10% fund size in first cycle and +20% in the second cycle)

In a conservative scenario, current price will reflect a P/E ratio of 12-14x, excluding the value of carried interest (which I assume less than 50% of what management reports).

In the remain scenarios, P/Es are very attractive.

12. Expected Returns

Under these scenarios, I get very attractive IRRs.

Even in the conservative scenario, the IRR is double digit:

However, the conservative case is not a worst case scenario. Under a worst case scenario, returns can still be negative from here.

13. My views and conclusions

I bought Antin stock more than two years ago at an average price of €11.4 a share. Since then, the stock is down by 35% — the worst performer of my portfolio. Including dividends, performance is -26%.

• Under a conservative scenario, expected share price will be c.€9.4, 18% lower than my investment. Adding €1.3 of expected dividends, leads to -7% return, which adding back the current dividends received will imply a neutral return. This means recovering the money.

• In the rest of scenarios, implied returns are of 30-50%, which are still significantly below my expectations, as the implied IRR over a 5/6-year tenure period will be low.

The delays in the fundraising cycle have affected the temporary value of the company. While it can increase in the next 2-3 years,

Selling now at the lowest point I think it’s not a good solution. The high volatility can lead to a partial recovery over the next weeks, and it seems unlikely that the stock can keep declining, considering it’s trading at a very conservative valuation.

This bad performance is materially impacting the performance of my portfolio, but I believe it’s worth waiting, although the uncertainty is high.

Since we can get our money back and earn a decent return in the coming quarters, I decided to keep it as it is.

Time will tell if being patient will have a positive outcome.

14. Lessons learned

When a company is facing some headwinds — note that Antin is not fighting for survival, but rather to see if it will keep growing — it’s very important to review the main drivers of its business and be extremely conservative.

These are some of the mistakes I made.

But the most important thing is that whenever we have doubts, always factor the most conservative scenario.

More specifically for Antin and the Private Equity industry:

A fundraising cycle depends on performance and distributions.

• First, Antin is not returning all the capital back from prior funds. This was forecastable as they don’t do much exits every year. We could have reached the conclusion that Fund III will certainly be extended.

• Second, extending the life of a fund generally implies lower returns, as the IRR is highly dependent on timing.

• Third, and most important, before starting fundraising of a fund, it’s critical to invest the current one. Antin faces huge delay in Fund V, and while deployment of capital can be done fast if needed, it was also clear that by the end of 2026 it was very challenging to have all capital deployed.

The lesson is clear: if there are challenges, always forecast the most conservative scenario. For Antin, it’s a reduction of AUM in the next fundraising and delays. While it might not materially impact the valuation,

Best,

Phil

This is not investment recommendation.

Asymmetric Ventures

Disclaimer:

Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation

1. Executive Summary

Have you ever booked a hotel through Booking? Search for a flight on Kayak? Or maybe through Priceline? Ever used OpenTable? Agoda?

All these are brands owned by Booking Holdings, the world’s largest online travel intermediary.

We recently invested in this company due to its market positioning, long-term tailwinds and a reasonable valuation for a business like this.

Our investment thesis rests on five pillars:

• First, Booking.com, the world’s largest online intermediary that facilitates more than $185bn of gross travel bookings. It’s 1.5x larger than Expedia, the second largest group.

• Second, the tailwinds of the industry. Tourism is an industry benefiting from tailwinds driven by the expansion of middle classes, social media and the need to travel, new lifestyle based on experiences and the ease of travel.

• Third, a capital-light business generating strong cash flows with significant growth ahead.

• Fourth, capital allocation has been disciplined and shareholder-friendly, buying back huge amounts of stock, further increasing shareholder returns.

• Fifth, a reasonable valuation: c.23x earnings and c.18x FCF for a business compounding FCF per share at double digits. We always say that valuation matters — here it works in our favor.

The threat of AI and LLMs disrupting platforms is also impacting Booking, which has seen its valuation compress: from trading above 30x to c.23x earnings today, a sharp de-rating over the last year, partly driven by the conflict in the middle east and its impact on tourism.

Risks to the investment thesis are real and well-disclosed:

• The rise of Marriott and other major groups that are trying to bring customers to their own systems by offering lower prices and loyalty programs.

• The rise of large generative-AI travel agents (Google Travel, ChatGPT plugins, Perplexity) could disintermediate the search-to-booking funnel that Booking has so effectively monetized.

The business has been performing very well during the last years. However, the rise of AI has increased concerns over the long-term sustainability of the business — a repeating pattern across many other industries.

But, as we will see, LLMs are unlikely to disrupt Booking’s business and increasing AI capacities can only improve the platform, becoming even more relevant.

Several quarters ago investors were willing to pay above 30x, with a median P/E of 28x over the last 4 years. Today, business keeps delivering good results, but valuation has been significantly reduced.

We believe this can represent an interesting opportunity, so we have been buying shares and reviewing the company in depth.

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Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The …

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Moody’s Q2 2026: Reading the Quarter

Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

I. Introduction

Moody’s Corporation reported second-quarter 2026 results on July 22:

• Revenue, adjusted EPS and margins all came in well above consensus expectations. Revenue of $2.19 billion beat the Street estimate of roughly $2.08 billion by about 5%, and adjusted diluted EPS of $4.68 was approximately a 10% beat versus consensus of $4.25.

• A second consecutive quarter with more than $2 trillion of rated debt (issuance up 33% year-over-year, 20% year-to-date), driven by an unusually broad set of funding “deep currents” — refinancing, AI-related investment, private credit, digital finance, energy transition and emerging markets.

• Continued momentum in Moody’s Analytics, with ARR up nearly 9%, retention at 95%, and recurring revenue now 99% of the segment. Like a Swiss watch, this segment keeps delivering predictable results.

• Substantial margin expansion and higher capital returns, with the buyback raised to up to $3.0 billion and the company on track to return more than 130% of free cash flow to shareholders this year.

Rob Fauber summed it up as “a quarter that demonstrated the power of the Moody’s model, a franchise that’s capable of capitalizing on strong issuance activity, durable recurring revenue growth in analytics, and disciplined execution across the company.” This post walks through what Moody’s actually reported, what management said in the prepared remarks and the Q&A, how guidance moved, and how the company is positioned against the broader ratings and risk-analytics industry.

The market reaction was modestly positive: the stock traded up around 2% following the release, and several analysts raised their price targets in the following days.

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Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The …

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I. Executive Summary

Dear readers,

Today I bring another high quality company that all you know, but I bet just a few know that it’s a publicly traded company: Lindt.

Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG (Lindt), is a Swiss-headquartered premium chocolate manufacturer. You will certainly know this company as they are in all supermarkets, and probably, always the most expensive chocolate, driven by the quality of the product.

The Group operates a vertically integrated value chain across 12 production sites and reports under three geographic segments:

• Europe (50% of revenue),

• North America (37%), and

• Rest of the World (13%)

The investment story is one of category leadership in premium and super-premium chocolate, with a portfolio of brands led by Lindt and Lindor (35% of revenue), Excellence (14%) and the seasonal Gold Bunny franchise (≈8%), complemented by US assets Ghirardelli and Russell Stover and heritage Italian/Austrian labels Caffarel, Hofbauer and Küfferle.

Lindt has compounded returns on invested capital from approximately 12% in 2016 to 23.1% in 2025 and has paid an increased dividend for 30 consecutive years.

With FY2025 revenue of CHF 5,920 million, EBIT of CHF 971 million (16.4% margin) and net income of CHF 738 million. At the actual prices, Lindt trades at an implied total market capitalization of CHF 22.0 billion across different share classes and an enterprise value of CHF 22.2 billion.

This translates to:

• Forward EV/EBITDA of approximately 17.0x

• P/E of approximately 30x on FY2025 figures.

The 12-month consensus price target implies upside of +22.6% on the LISN and +10.4% on the LISP. The Group cut its 2026 organic growth guidance to 4–6% from a long-term 6–8% target in March 2026, citing volume-elasticity in response to double-digit price actions and US trade-policy frictions; shares fell more than 6% on the announcement.

The share price performance has been weak — mainly impacted by a reduced guidance for 2027 — and it’s time to see if this represents an interesting opportunity for the long-term.

Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It does not constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available information.

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Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

Index:

1. Introduction

2. FY26 at a glance

3. United States: now the largest market

4. United Kingdom: fewer doors, more revenue

5. Group financials: P&L, cash flow and returns

6. Analyst Q&A: main themes from the results call

7. Strategy Deep Dive

8. FY27 guidance

9. Recent news and industry context

10. Valuation snapshot

11. Conclusions

I. Introduction

Watches of Switzerland Group reported its fiscal year 2026 results (53 weeks ended 3 May 2026) on 14 July 2026, and followed the morning results call with an afternoon Strategy Deep Dive — a c.100-slide capital markets presentation covering every pillar of the growth plan, with dedicated sections from the CEO, the Deputy CEO (US), the UK President, Hodinkee founder Ben Clymer, Deutsch & Deutsch President Tad Deutsch, and the CFO. This note covers both events, the analyst Q&A, and what our financial model implies about the underlying trends.

CEO Brian Duffy framed FY26 as “a year of strong execution against what was a complex and changeable operating backdrop” — a backdrop that included US tariffs, sharply higher gold prices, brand margin changes and ongoing consumer pressure in the UK. Against that, the group delivered a record year: sales of £1.828bn, up 13% in constant currency, with an improving trend through the year (H1 +10%, H2 +17%).

The structural milestone of the year: the US surpassed the UK to become the group’s largest market by both revenue and profits, reaching 51% of group revenue and 62% of adjusted EBIT (including Roberto Coin wholesale). Management noted the group remains 95% domestic-driven, with very little international/tourist business since VAT-free shopping was removed in the UK post-Brexit in 2021.

Duffy closed the call on a confident note: “2026 was clearly a good year for us in terms of sales growth and in terms of developing our infrastructure and our portfolio of our brands and stores… 2027, as we’ve been discussing, has started well, allows us to kind of confidently confirm our guidance.”

Wosg Fy26 Results Final

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Wosg Deep Dive 140726

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Wosg Fy26 Results Statement Final

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Over the last 2 years, I was looking like a fool by owning a Rolex retailer that “was going to disappear”. YTD, the stock is up +68%, and nearly +100% since we acquire the stock in March 2024.

A potential takeover?

An important factor currently affecting the share price are recent press articles reporting that WOSG management held talks over potential takeover offers to take the company private.

Full press article: https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/watches-switzerland-held-talks-over-potential-takeover-offers-sources-say-2026-07-13/

There are several important conclusions from this article:

• Private equity firms are looking at the company. This signals that the company remains undervalued, that cash flows are perceived as stable (to be able to leverage the buyout), and, there is still growth potential.

• One of the sources said the company was seeking an offer of significantly ​more than £7.50 per ​share (the stock currently trades at £7.8 per share, so any offer IMHO should be significantly higher).

II. FY26 at a glance

The headline KPIs (constant currency unless noted; FY26 was a 53-week year):

• Group revenue £1,828m, +13% constant currency (+11% reported); H2 accelerated to +17% vs +10% in H1

• US revenue £927m, +24% (H2 +27%); US retail +25%; the US is now 51% of group revenue and 62% of adjusted EBIT

• UK & Europe revenue £901m, +4% (+5% for the UK excluding the closed European showrooms)

• Adjusted EBITDA £202m, +5%; margin 11.1% (-50bps)

• Adjusted EBIT £155m, +6% constant currency (+3% reported); margin 8.5%, -60bps

• Statutory PBT £133m, +76%; adjusted PBT £143m, +5%

• Adjusted EPS 45.2p, +9% (+3.6p); effective tax rate 26.7% (-110bps, helped by a one-off Roberto Coin tax credit)

• Free cash flow £162m with 80% conversion (FY25: £98m, 51%); net debt reduced to £57m (0.3x adjusted EBITDA)

• ROCE 18.0% (FY25: 19.0%)

• Growth pillars: pre-owned +22%, ecommerce +21%, Roberto Coin +20%; Mayors Roberto Coin shop-in-shop sales more than doubled

• £66m of expansionary capex across 13 major projects; £39m spent on acquisitions (Deutsch & Deutsch plus the final Roberto Coin payment); £14m of buybacks in the year

Revenue CAGR FY15–FY26 stands at 15.5%, with adjusted EBIT compounding at 29.5% over the same period — a track record management leaned on heavily in the afternoon strategy presentation.

III. United States: now the largest market

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Dear readers,

Today I bring a company that is not very well known by the investment community. I love the aviation sector due to its high barriers to entry and the tailwinds of the industry.

You might notice the name says “Corporación”, rather than corporation. It’s not a typo. Today we are analyzing airports in Argentina and Uruguay.

I already own private hangars in American airports through Sky Harbour, and the majority of the engines of commercial planes through GE (which is up +100% since posting the investment thesis a year ago), and Safran, acquired a few weeks ago.

It’s a really interesting sector and I think it’s worth reviewing this company to understand the economics of operating airports.

Snapshot

Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

1. Investment summary

Corporación América Airports (CAAP) is one of the largest private airport operators in the world, running 52 airport concessions across six countries — Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador, Armenia and Italy — and serving 86.7 million passengers in 2025.

It is the listed vehicle of the Eurnekian family’s airport interests, controlled through A.C.I. Airports, and is the only pure-play, globally diversified airport concessionaire trading on a U.S. exchange.

The investment debate is unusually clean: a structurally attractive infrastructure business, growing double digits with the strongest balance sheet in its history, set against the market’s deep discount for its Argentine centre of gravity.

• Argentina accounts for 50% of the EBITDA contribution. The remaining 50% in Ecuador, Uruguay, Italy, Brazil and Armenia

• Company is headquartered in Luxembourg

• The controlling family owns 18% of the shares

The bull case rests on four pillars:

1. First, concession economics: long-dated, quasi-monopoly airport contracts with regulated aeronautical tariffs and a fast-growing, higher-margin commercial layer (retail, duty-free, parking, advertising)

2. Second, operating leverage: FY2025 revenue ex-construction rose 8% while Adjusted EBITDA ex-IFRIC12 grew 15%, lifting that margin to roughly 41%, and 1Q26 carried the trend further with EBITDA ex-IFRIC up 26%

3. Third, a solid balance sheet — net debt fell to 0.5x LTM Adjusted EBITDA by 1Q26 with US$666 mm of cash, versus 2–3x typical for peers

4. Fourth, a credible growth pipeline: a 35-year Armenia extension to 2067 with a US$425 mm program, a Galápagos extension, and new awards.

The bear case is equally legible:

• Argentina is the single largest driver of traffic and value, so currency, inflation and political risk dominate; IAS 29 hyperinflation accounting injects real distortion into reported numbers;

• The assets are concessions (finite, renewable, occasionally subject to government buy-out rights) rather than owned freeholds;

• The company pays no dividend; and

• Control sits with a single family with related-party history. These are the reasons CAAP trades at roughly 7.0x EV/EBITDA against 9–13x for Mexican and European peers.

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Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

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Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

I. Executive summary

Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (”SpaceX”) came to market in June 2026 in a global initial public offering of 555,555,555 newly issued Class A shares at an offering price of $135.00 per share, for net primary proceeds of approximately $74.4bn (about $85.7bn if the 83.3m-share over-allotment is exercised in full). Trading on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX started on Friday June 12, 2026.

The company is a Texas corporation headquartered in Starbase, Texas.

SpaceX operates three segments:

1. Space: provides launch services to commercial, civil and government customers with the world’s only fleet of reusable orbital rockets and is the primary launch provider to the U.S. government.

2. Connectivity is Starlink — the largest satellite-internet network ever built, with more than 9,600 satellites in orbit and about 10.3m subscribers across 164 countries.

3. AI: combines gigawatt-scale compute infrastructure (Colossus), the Grok frontier model and the X platform, following the stock-financed combination with xAI in February 2026

Financially, the company pairs rapid, profitable growth in Connectivity with very heavy investment everywhere else.

• Revenue grew from $10.4bn in 2023 to $18.7bn in 2025 (a 34% CAGR),

• Adjusted EBITDA from $3.8bn to $6.6bn, while GAAP results swung from a $4.6bn net loss (2023, including a $3.8bn AI-segment impairment) to a $0.8bn profit (2024) and back to a $4.9bn net loss in 2025 as the AI build-out accelerated.

• Capital expenditure tripled to $20.7bn in 2025, taking cash flow burn to roughly $13.9bn

At $135.00 the offering values the company at roughly $1.77 trillion of equity (13,075.9m post-offering shares) — approximately 92x 2025 revenue and about 260x 2025 Adjusted EBITDA. Earnings- and cash-flow-based multiples are not meaningful.

Elon Musk will retain approximately 83.6% of the voting power through super-voting Class B shares, and no dividends are anticipated. He became the first trillionaire in history.

Read more

We did find out that there was another similar company called Rentokil, which apparently trades at lower multiples.

I decided to take a look at it.

Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

I. Executive Summary

Rentokil Initial plc is a UK-headquartered global services group that, since the October 2022 acquisition of Terminix, is the world’s largest pest-control company by revenue.

The business has two reporting categories:

1. Pest Control (commercial, residential and termite — ~83% of 2025 revenue)

2. Hygiene & Wellbeing (washroom, dental waste, specialist hygiene — ~17%).

It operates in approximately 90 countries with around 60,000 employees

The financial pattern over the last decade has two distinct chapters.

• From 2012 to 2024 Rentokil was a steadily compounding mid-cap services business, growing revenue from £2.2bnn to £5.4bn (≈8% CAGR) with an Adjusted EBITDA margin in the mid teens and some level of leverage.

• In October 2022 the Company acquired Terminix for ~$6.7bn, issuing ~290m new shares and assuming substantial debt. Revenue stepped to £5.4bn in 2023 and ~$6.9bn in 2025 (company changed their functional currency to USD).

• The post-deal period has been more uneven: organic growth in North America slowed to low single digits, integration costs and a U.S. termite-damage litigation provision pulled reported earnings below their pre-deal trajectory, and leverage peaked before de-leveraging back to 2.6x at the end of 2025.

The industry is large, growing and structurally fragmented.

• The global pest-control market is sized at roughly $25-27bn and is forecast to grow at 5-8% per year through the next decade, driven by urbanization, climate-driven pest migration, regulatory tightening and growth of integrated pest management.

• The top six providers — Rollins, Terminix (now Rentokil), Rentokil, Ecolab, Anticimex and Aptive — collectively hold ~45% of the market. The remainder is fragmented across thousands of regional operators.

On the Asymmetric Ventures framework, Rentokil reads as 3 PASS / 3 PARTIAL — a different pattern from Rollins.

• Essential product and low disruption risk: clear PASS.

• Oligopoly structure and barriers to entry: PARTIAL — Rentokil enjoys global scale advantages but, especially in North America, faces intensive route-density competition from Rollins.

• High earnings power & track record: PARTIAL — pre-Terminix ROIC of ~12-16% has stepped down to ~4-5% on the larger, goodwill-heavy capital base, with recovery dependent on integration delivery.

• Reasonable valuation: PASS — at roughly 10x EV/EBITDA and 23x FCF, Rentokil trades at less than a third of Rollins’ EBITDA multiple, reflecting a discount that based on the past trajectory might be justified.

II. Introduction

What the company does, where it is located, and the industry it operates in

Rentokil Initial plc is a global business-services group, dual-listed on the London Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange via American Depositary Receipts.

Its head office is at Compass House, Manor Royal, Crawley, West Sussex, in the United Kingdom; the operating headquarters of the largest business, North American Pest Control, are in Memphis, Tennessee — Terminix’s former home. The Company operates in roughly 90 countries through approximately 60,000 employees.

After the disposals of its France Workwear business in September 2025 and various other smaller non-core assets, Rentokil now operates in two reporting categories: Pest Control and Hygiene & Wellbeing. Pest Control accounts for ~83% of FY2025 revenue; Hygiene & Wellbeing for the remainder.

Company history

Rentokil’s pest-control origin dates to 1925 when Harold Maxwell-Lefroy, Professor of Entomology at Imperial College London, developed a woodworm-treatment fluid commissioned to tackle a deathwatch-beetle infestation in Westminster Hall.

After his accidental death later that year, his assistant Bessie Eades acquired the formula and incorporated Rentokil Ltd. A parallel rodent-control business, British Ratin Co. Ltd., was founded in 1927 using a bacterial poison developed by Danish pharmacist Georg Neumann. British Ratin acquired Rentokil in 1957 and adopted the Rentokil name in 1962.

Through the 1970s and 1980s Rentokil expanded into hygiene services and acquired hundreds of small businesses under Sir Clive Thompson. In 1996 it merged with the FTSE 100 business-services group BET (which owned the Initial linen-rental business), forming Rentokil Initial plc. The 2000s saw a long period of restructuring as the Company narrowed its portfolio away from facilities services and back toward pest control and hygiene. The disposal of the CWS-boco workwear joint venture in 2017 was a notable inflection — it generated a one-time gain large enough to distort that year’s reported operating profit and net income.

Andy Ransom became CEO in October 2013 and led the strategic refocus, culminating in the October 2022 acquisition of Terminix Global Holdings — at roughly $6.7bn one of the largest UK-led cross-border deals of that year. Terminix was the second-largest U.S. pest-control operator behind Rollins, with around 2.9 million customers and a national branch network. Rentokil financed the deal with $2.4bn of new bond debt and ~290m new ordinary shares issued to Terminix shareholders, who emerged with ~26% of the combined entity. From January 2025 Rentokil changed its presentation currency from sterling to U.S. dollars, reflecting the fact that the U.S. is now the source of more than half of group revenue and roughly 60% of profit.

In January 2026 the Company announced that Andy Ransom would retire from the CEO role following the 2026 Annual General Meeting (7 May) and be succeeded by Mike Duffy, a U.S. citizen and career operator most recently CEO of OnTrac, the logistics business. Duffy joined Rentokil on 16 February 2026 as CEO Designate and assumed full executive responsibility on 16 March 2026.

III. Business model

What the company does

The core business is identifying, treating and preventing pests to protect the safety and hygiene of our customers’ premises.

Rentokil sells recurring service contracts that send trained technicians to commercial and residential premises to prevent and remediate infestations, manage washroom hygiene, and provide related specialist hygiene services. Pricing is per visit or per period; visits typically occur monthly or quarterly for commercial accounts and on an as-needed or contract basis for residential customers.

Both Pest Control and Hygiene & Wellbeing are largely subscription-based businesses, where customers pay for regular inspections, treatments or servicing over a defined contract period. This enables steady, predictable revenue streams, and a low level of exposure to economic cycles.

• 70% is contracted revenue — Company has a high degree of stable revenue providing stable and predictable cash flows. In pest control, most clients are on annual or multi-annual contracts

• 30% of the revenue is a one-off (per-job or per-incident basis), which is dependent on clients requesting their services for specific tasks

Customer retention is high — pest-control churn rates are routinely in the 80-90%+ range across the industry — and pricing power is supported by the small share of customer spend that the service represents.

Segments and revenue mix

Pest Control: by far the largest line.

• Pest Control — North America (now ~65% of group revenue): commercial, residential and termite pest control delivered through the integrated Rentokil-Terminix branch network. This business is the global market leader by revenue and is the main driver of group growth and integration challenges.

• Pest Control — International (~17% of group revenue): operations across Europe (including Latin America), the UK, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, MENAT and the Pacific. International posted 3.7% organic revenue growth in 2025 — the fastest-growing part of the Group on a like-for-like basis — supported by both pricing and volume.

Hygiene & Wellbeing: the complementary services tail.

• Hygiene & Wellbeing (~17% of group revenue, $1,205m in 2025): washroom-hygiene services, specialist hygiene (e.g. healthcare, food service), and Dental Waste Disposal. Revenue grew 4.3% in 2025 (2.3% organic), with margin similar to International Pest Control.

The compositional shift is dramatic. Pest Control North America was $440m in 2016, sat at $800m in 2021, then quadrupled to $4.25bn in 2023 once Terminix was fully consolidated. The Hygiene & Other category fell as a share of total because the denominator grew, and because of selective disposals; the absolute revenue contribution of Hygiene & Wellbeing alone has actually risen.

Geographic mix shifted accordingly. The illustrative split below sketches the structural change.

Main customers and contract economics

Rentokil serves a mix of commercial and residential customers:

• Commercial accounts dominate by revenue: food processors, restaurants, hotels, hospitals, logistics operators, retailers, schools and offices. Commercial pest control is increasingly a regulatory and reputational necessity rather than a discretionary spend — food-safety authorities require evidence of integrated pest-management programes, and a single rodent sighting can close a food-service location.

• Residential customers, while smaller per account, are higher-margin and more loyal on a multi-year basis.

Service contracts are typically annual with multi-year renewal patterns. Rentokil’s industry-standard retention rate is in the 80-90% range; for the Terminix residential book in North America the integration period has seen retention pressure that the Company has been working to recover through the “RIGHT WAY 2” growth plan launched in 2024.

Last, I think it’s important to analyze how today’s society can’t live with insects or small animals near them. We are more and more becoming less connected with nature — and don’t get me wrong, I don’t want to have rats at home, but we are less tolerant with rodents, insects, etc. These are good news for these companies are there services become even more important. The covid pandemic has probably accelerated this trend.

IV. Industry overview

Market size and how the industry is evolving

Independent market-research providers size the global pest-control services market at roughly USD 25-27 billion in 2024-25, with forecast compound annual growth rates of 5-8% over the next decade, implying a market that roughly doubles by the mid-2030s. The variance across providers reflects different scope definitions (some include pest-control products and adjacent hygiene services; others limit the count to commercial and residential service revenue only).

Three structural drivers underpin growth.

• Urbanization and food density. As populations concentrate in cities and food production scales, the breeding environments for pests multiply. Rentokil has cited demographic urbanization as a primary long-cycle growth driver in its annual report.

• Climate-driven pest migration. Warmer winters and shifting climatic zones are extending the geographic range of vector species (mosquitoes, ticks, termites). The WHO recorded 14.6 million dengue cases globally in 2024 — a record — and rising tropical-disease incidence creates a public-health imperative for pest control beyond the traditional commercial use case.

• Regulatory tightening and integrated pest management. Food-safety, healthcare and hospitality regulators increasingly require documented integrated pest-management (IPM) programes. Chemical bans push the industry toward higher-skill, higher-priced biological and technological alternatives — favorable to scale operators like Rentokil that can invest in R&D and digital tools.

There is scientific evidence that urbanization and climate change is driving the growth of rat populations in large cities.

Science Advances: Increasing rat numbers in cities are linked to climate warming, urbanization, and human population

PMP: Study shows rat populations are on the rise thanks to warming temperatures, city growth

On the demand side, the residential segment is becoming more digital: inbound leads from search and price-comparison platforms now dominate new-customer acquisition. Rentokil’s 2024 commentary highlighted the rebound in inbound digital lead flow as a key signal of North America’s growth recovery.

Competitors: a partial oligopoly at the top of a long fragmented tail

Industry concentration is meaningful at the top but limited overall. The six largest players — Rollins, Terminix (now part of Rentokil), Rentokil itself, Ecolab Pest Elimination, Anticimex, and Aptive Environmental — collectively hold approximately 45% of the global market. The remaining 55% is split across thousands of regional and local operators ranging from $1-100m in revenue.

The structure of the top tier is distinct from a true oligopoly because the major players have very different geographic footprints and ownership structures.

• Rollins, Inc. (NYSE: ROL): the U.S. pure-play pest-control compounder. Owns Orkin and a portfolio of brands; ~$3.8bn revenue in 2025; over 30% family ownership through the Rollins family; trades at a premium valuation (~31x EBITDA) reflecting consistent execution and a fortress balance sheet. The most direct listed competitor to Rentokil in North America. We reviewed this company during the last week:
  

• Anticimex (Sweden): private, owned by EQT (since 2012). Highly acquisitive across Europe, North America, Asia Pacific and Latin America. Has been the industry’s digital-services pioneer, claiming 500,000 IoT-enabled SMART devices installed globally by early 2025. The natural acquisition target or merger partner for either Rentokil or Rollins, though private-equity ownership makes timing unpredictable.

• Ecolab Pest Elimination (NYSE: ECL division): a division of Ecolab Inc., the global cleaning, sanitation and water-treatment major. Focuses on commercial/industrial pest control bundled with broader sanitation contracts. Distinct go-to-market — sold as part of a wider hygiene programe — limits direct overlap with residential focus, but competes hard in commercial.

• Aptive Environmental (private): U.S. residential-focused, door-to-door sales model. Smaller than the top three but growing rapidly. Has been a source of customer churn for the larger players in U.S. residential.

• Long tail of regional operators: Massey Services, Dodson, Arrow Exterminators in the U.S.; family-owned regional operators across Europe and Asia. Many of these are bolt-on acquisition candidates for the larger players — Rollins, Rentokil and Anticimex have each completed dozens of bolt-on deals annually.

Here lies a key factor to consider: Rentokil, Rollins and other players will keep consolidating the industry. Little by little, year by year, these companies are going to become more relevant and gain strong pricing power with the lack of competitors.

Competitive advantages

Rentokil divides its operating model into 6 drivers:

1- Colleagues. The company is delivering positive returns in this area, increasing the health & safety of customers and reducing employee churn. This increases efficiency of the operations.

2- Customers: The company retains at least 80% of their customers, a strong retention rate considering it’s a highly fragmented market and, despite the management talks a lot about the brand, I don’t think brand becomes as relevant as in other industries.

3- Growth: the company is investing in improving their services and is increasing the value of the contracts. Pricing is being increased slightly above inflation.

4- Profit & margin - Route density and cost control is key to keep healthy margins. With increased size the company can become much more efficient than local players.

5- Capital allocation framework: divided in 4 buckets, cash, M&A, dividend and shareholder value. We will cover it later.

6- ESG.

In the following slide from 2025 results, we can see how the company is progressing and delivering in each of these 6 topics/initiatives:

Pest-control operators win or lose on three competitive advantages, all of which Rentokil possesses to differing degrees.

• Route density. Service routes are densest where customer bases are most concentrated, and density drops drive-time per service stop dramatically. Rentokil’s combined Rentokil-Terminix North American footprint is the largest in the industry by branch count (~600 at deal close, targeted at ~400 optimized branches by 2026).

• Brand and trust. In residential pest control, branded incumbents win because the service is intermittent, the consequences of poor service are high (re-infestation, property damage), and trial is socially expensive. Rentokil and Terminix are both globally recognized names; the integration into a single “Rentokil North America” legal entity in 2025 was a key step in consolidating that brand equity.

• Digital and data platforms. Rentokil has invested significantly in its PestConnect IoT platform and myRentokil customer-management interface, and the integration of the Terminix PestPac and Wayport systems into a unified operational stack is targeted to complete in 2026-27. These platforms generate operating leverage and switching costs for commercial customers integrated into them.

• Switching costs in commercial. Integrated commercial accounts (food production, healthcare, hospitality) embed Rentokil into their compliance documentation and IPM systems; the cost and risk of switching providers is materially higher than the cost of the service itself.

• Density-based unit economics in established markets. In mature geographies the existing branch network creates a route-density advantage that compounds; a new entrant must subsidize the same coverage on a much smaller revenue base.

When reviewing the Annual Report of 2025, one thing that surprised me is how operations are gaining efficiencies every year in many fronts:

1. Investing in the employees to avoid accidents and avoid working days lost. The rate of working days lost has decreases from 8.7 in 2021 to 5.65 in 2025. Multiply this figure by thousands of people and the impact is meaningful.

2. Keeping customer retention high in the 80s

The company has the ability to raise prices with inflation every year as they provide a service that many people in today’s world see as extremelly necessary.

Is there a moat, and what could erode it?

There is not a clear moat in these companies, as barriers to entry are low. What creates the moat is the scale of these companies that can compete globally against any local competitor, and also have the financial strength to acquire competitors.

Barriers to entry are relatively low, as you need pest control products and a van. However, becoming efficiently to compete against these larger companies is another story.

Rentokil and Rollins are so big that we can’t think about potential new direct competitors, in an industry that nobody is watching. All eyes are on AI and technology.

• Rentokil and Rollins are more efficient, have huge fire power and extended branding in their territories.

What can erode this moat?

It’s difficult to find reasons. Probably their biggest enemies are themselves. If they keep discipline and acquiring the right companies, these companies will be able to protect their moat.

V. The management

Key executives, backgrounds and reputation

Mike Duffy — Chief Executive Officer (from 16 March 2026).

• U.S. citizen, based in North America. Joined Rentokil as CEO Designate on 16 February 2026 and succeeded Andy Ransom as CEO on 16 March 2026, ahead of the 7 May 2026 Annual General Meeting.

• Career background: 25+ years of US business leadership across B2B and B2C services. Most recently CEO of OnTrac (a last-mile residential parcel delivery business owned by LaserShip, 2023-2025); CEO of FleetPride (largest US heavy-duty truck-parts distributor, 2021-2023); CEO of C&S Wholesale Grocers (one of the largest US grocery wholesalers, 2018-2020). Earlier senior roles at Cardinal Health and Gillette. Independent director of Republic Services (NYSE: RSG) since 2020.

• This background is very interesting, because these companies operate similar to logistics companies. Route density is core to maximize revenue, and therefore, this profile makes total sense. Although he has no background in the industry, he will likely focus on operations and efficiencies.

Andy Ransom — outgoing CEO.

• CEO from October 2013 to March 2026 (12.5 years), the architect of Rentokil’s strategic refocus on pest control and the Terminix acquisition. To remain with the Company in a transition capacity until the 2026 AGM. Lower personal shareholding than US peer CEOs (~0.09% of Rentokil) reflecting UK governance norms rather than lack of alignment.

Paul Edgecliffe-Johnson — Group Chief Financial Officer.

• Joined as CFO in early 2025 after extended tenure as CFO of InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG). Successor to Stuart Ingall-Tombs, who departed in late 2024. Aaron Coley was previously North America CFO. The CFO transition coincides with Rentokil’s currency-presentation change and ongoing Terminix integration.

Richard Solomons — Board Chair.

• Independent Chair. Former CEO of InterContinental Hotels Group (which shaped his prior working relationship with Paul Edgecliffe-Johnson). UK plc governance — majority-independent board, one-share-one-vote, no dual-class structure.

Ownership and skin in the game

Rentokil’s ownership is overwhelmingly institutional.

• Approximately 88% of free float sits with institutional shareholders;

• No single holder is controlling.

• Insider ownership at the executive level is very modest: the outgoing CEO held ~0.09% of the Company. Mike Duffy’s joining package includes a minimum shareholding requirement of 400% of base salary, which over time should build a more meaningful executive stake.

The most strategically significant minority shareholder is Trian Fund Management (Nelson Peltz’s activist vehicle), which disclosed an initial stake in 2023 and built up to roughly 64.6 million ordinary shares (~2.6% of share capital). Trian secured a board seat in 2024 and has been an active voice on integration KPIs and capital-allocation priorities. The CEO-succession process and the choice of a US-based operator reflect that engagement.

Compensation and alignment of interests

The incoming CEO’s pay package illustrates how the Board has positioned alignment going forward.

• Base salary of US$1,600,000 — substantial in absolute terms but, as a proportion of total potential pay, modest.

• Annual bonus of up to 225% of base salary (i.e. up to $3.6m). Performance measures will be disclosed in the 2025 Directors’ Remuneration Report; in line with prior practice these typically reference Group revenue growth, Adjusted Operating Profit margin and Free Cash Flow conversion.

• Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) awards of up to 375% of base salary (up to $6m at grant date). Performance metrics historically include relative TSR, EPS growth and ROIC — putting capital efficiency at the heart of executive incentive design.

• Replacement awards of US$3.98m in Rentokil shares to compensate for forfeited awards at OnTrac, vesting over time.

• Shareholding requirement of 400% of base salary, with post-employment shareholding requirements that prevent immediate disposal after departure.

Andy Ransom’s outgoing pay was £1.91m total for FY2024 (51.5% salary, 48.5% variable, including share awards). This figure is materially below the median FTSE-100 CEO and well below his nearest listed peer (Rollins’ CEO Jerry Gahagan).

Recent insider trading

There has been no material insider buying or selling by Rentokil executives in the period leading up to the CEO transition that would carry strong signaling value. Trian’s stake is unchanged at recent disclosure. The 2025 disposal of France Workwear was a corporate transaction rather than an insider trade and signals a sharper portfolio focus rather than executive sentiment.

Sources: Rentokil Initial press release 13 January 2026 (CEO succession); Rentokil 2024 Annual Report (Directors’ Remuneration Report); Simply Wall St management and ownership data; Investing.com institutional holdings; Trian Fund Management Schedule 13G disclosures; Bloomberg executive profiles.

Quick Review of the Strategy

2012 — Turnaround conglomerate; the last year before focus

CEO: Alan Brown | Chair: John McAdam.

Rentokil Initial was still a six-market conglomerate — pest control, hygiene, workwear, facilities services, plants and the City Link parcels business — and posted a statutory pre-tax loss of about £50.5m, driven largely by writedowns at City Link, even as revenue rose ~2.8% and adjusted operating profit improved ~5.1%.

The statement framed progress against the Operational Excellence Agenda launched in 2008 and signalled that the heavy restructuring was largely complete, freeing the group to pivot toward growth and innovation.

• Acquired Western Exterminator (~$100m), expanding into the US West Coast and becoming the third-largest pest controller in America (part of ~£128m of acquired annualised revenue in the year).

• Continued efforts to turn around the loss-making City Link parcels business (losses narrowed; volumes up ~17%).

• Transitioned Initial Facilities toward Total Facilities Management while scaling back the Spanish operation to reduce exposure.

• Early innovation that would later mature — PestConnect concept, bed-bug detection, heat treatment.

2013 — The pivotal year: City Link sold, Ransom takes over

CEO: Alan Brown until 1 October, then Andy Ransom | Chair: John McAdam.

This was the strategic hinge of the whole period. The disposal of the deeply loss-making City Link and the subsequent CEO succession reset the company’s direction.

• Announced (April) the sale of City Link to private-equity firm Better Capital for a nominal sum, triggering a one-off disposal loss of ~£41.0m (mostly a non-cash writedown).

• Andy Ransom appointed CEO from 1 October, succeeding Alan Brown after a succession process; Ransom immediately launched a full review of group strategy.

• Agreed (announced February 2014) the sale of Initial Facilities to Interserve for £250m — together with City Link, refocusing the group on core categories: pest control, hygiene and workwear.

• Balance-sheet actions: a renegotiated, lower pension-contribution schedule and a new €350m bond to refinance a maturing €500m bond, taking the average cost of debt below 4%.

• Underlying trading only “steady” amid a weak Europe (Benelux); growth came mainly from M&A (Western Exterminator plus 19 pest-control bolt-ons).

2014 — Ransom’s first full year: the focused strategy is born

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: John McAdam.

The modern Rentokil strategy crystallised here, alongside completion of the Initial Facilities exit.

• Introduced a new four-quadrant capital-allocation framework — Emerging, Growth, Protect & Enhance, and Manage-for-Value — to prioritise investment and M&A.

• Set the company’s first-ever medium-term financial targets for revenue, profit and cash, plus a progressive dividend policy and a commitment to pay down debt.

• Established “speed of execution” as a defining management principle.

• Strong financial reset: net debt down £260m to £775m (lowest in 15 years), restructuring costs down ~£38m, free cash flow up ~£93m, and an S&P upgrade to BBB.

• Launched PestConnect and made 30 acquisitions, the large majority in the Growth and Emerging quadrants. (Workwear was still core, ~23% of revenue.)

2015 — Building the North American platform

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: John McAdam.

The defining move was scaling North America.

• • Acquired Steritech, a large US commercial pest-control and food-safety auditing business, transforming Rentokil’s North-American scale.

• • Anchored the decision to make North America — roughly half the global pest-control market — the primary growth engine, via organic growth plus heavy bolt-on M&A.

• • Embedded the RIGHT WAY plan: two core categories (Pest Control and Hygiene) across five regions on a low-cost, single-country operating model.

2016 — Reshaping the portfolio toward Pest Control & Hygiene

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: John McAdam. The pivotal decision was a portfolio pivot away from textiles/workwear.

• Announced (December) a joint venture with Franz Haniel (CWS-boco), folding Rentokil’s lower-growth Workwear and Hygiene operations in Benelux, Sweden and Central & Eastern Europe into Haniel’s business and retaining a ~17.8% stake.

• Continued dense bolt-on M&A; progress toward market leadership in India (the PCI tie-up).

• Delivered pest control for the Rio 2016 Olympics; engaged with the US CDC on Zika/mosquito control.

• Agreed a “next-generation pest control” digital partnership with Google and PA Consulting.

2017 — Completing the Haniel JV and the “big five” framework

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: John McAdam. The CEO statement moved to a “Q&A with Andy Ransom” format around this time.

• Completed the Haniel / CWS-boco JV (June), formally exiting much of the European workwear/hygiene business.

• Framed strategy around five challenges: organic growth in Pest Control, value through digital, building Hygiene, M&A execution, and Employer of Choice.

• Ongoing revenue grew 14.5% (10.7% from acquisitions) across 41 deals in 24 countries; Pest Control organic +5.8%.

• Formed Rentokil PCI, establishing clear No.1 status in India; identified vector/mosquito control as a major new growth line (VDCI).

2018 — Redeploying JV proceeds; France turnaround

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: John McAdam (his final report). With Pest Control and Hygiene now ~89% of operating profit, the strategy was to reinvest the Haniel proceeds into the two core categories.

• Became America’s No.1 in mosquito/vector control (VDCI, Mosquito Control Services, Aquatic Systems).

• Returned the France business to profitable growth for the first time since 2014 via a quality agenda.

• Scaled the Lumnia LED fly-control range and opened the Power Centre innovation hub in the UK.

• A reported pre-tax loss (£114.1m) reflected accounting remeasurement linked to the Haniel JV, not operating weakness; ongoing operating profit rose 13.3%.

2019 — Record organic growth and intensified M&A

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: Richard Solomons.

• Delivered the highest organic revenue growth in 15 years (4.5%), ahead of medium-term targets.

• M&A reached £316.5m across 41 deals, around 30 in Pest Control and nearly half of those in North America.

• Emphasised innovation as culture (“innovate or die”) and digital remastering of frontline service (PestConnect).

• Hit the 20% emissions-reduction target a year early; partnered with Cool Earth; entered Uruguay, Jordan and Sri Lanka.

2020 — COVID-19: defend, then pivot

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: Richard Solomons. The CEO described a three-phase approach — Crisis, Recovery, Strategic opportunity.

• Launched disinfection services across 60 countries in four weeks (training 7,000 technicians), generating ~£225m of revenue.

• Major balance-sheet protection: ~£100m+ of cost savings and ~£400m of cash-preservation measures, suspending M&A and the dividend and using the Bank of England financing facility (later repaid early).

• Accelerated the strategic decision to expand Hygiene beyond the washroom into surface and air hygiene (e.g. VIRUSKILLER).

• Resumed M&A later in the year as conditions stabilised.

2021 — Announcing Terminix and creating “Hygiene & Wellbeing”

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: Richard Solomons. Two landmark decisions.

• Announced (December) the agreement to acquire Terminix — to become the clear No.1 in North America and globally.

• At the September Capital Markets Day, launched the next evolution of the RIGHT WAY plan from January 2022: the enlarged Hygiene & Wellbeing category (folding in Ambius, Dental Hygiene and Cleanroom), a revised regional structure, and upgraded medium-term targets.

• Continued M&A at pace — 52 businesses acquired for £495.5m, part of 245 bought since 2016.

2022 — Completing Terminix: “a seminal year”

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: Richard Solomons.

• Completed the Terminix acquisition (October), creating the world’s largest pest-control company (~4.9m customers, ~58,600 colleagues).

• Integration plan built on seven workstreams; branch consolidation from 600+ to ~400 to drive route density and margin.

• Brand convergence: Terminix for residential/termite/SME, Rentokil for larger commercial.

• Raised the net cost-synergy estimate from at least $150m to at least $200m by 2025; continued ~one-deal-per-week pace, including first entries into Pakistan, Argentina and Israel.

2023 — First full integration year; the North America wobble

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: Richard Solomons.

• Delivered 4.9% organic revenue growth and a 16.6% margin despite inflation, but US growth in the second half disappointed.

• Launched THE RIGHT WAY 2 plan to reinvigorate US organic growth after a review found both weaker consumer demand and the company’s own sales-lead generation underperforming.

• Overachieved cost synergies ($69m vs a $60m target) and raised the total gross-synergy target by $50m to $325m by 2026; branch network already reduced by 97.

• Opened a new US science/innovation centre; made fresh North-America leadership hires; expanded the Trusted Advisor technician-lead programme.

2024 — Fixing North America while International powers ahead

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: Richard Solomons. A candidly challenging year.

• North America organic growth was just 1.5% as the integration weighed on performance, while International grew revenue 8.2% (organic +4.7%).

• Piloted satellite branches (smaller, fully branded, low-cost local hubs — 22 by year-end) to improve digital lead flow and local search presence.

• Overhauled paid and organic search marketing; pushed hard on five-star reviews; migrated branches onto the unified PestPac platform (49% of technicians).

• Piloted new sales/service pay plans and added a Customer Save team; integration targeted for completion by end-2026.

2025 — Turnaround taking hold; portfolio and structure simplified (Ransom’s last report)

CEO: Andy Ransom | Chair: Richard Solomons. Performance was in line with expectations, with clear signs the revised North-America strategy was working and improving second-half International growth.

• Disposed of the France Workwear business (treated as a discontinued operation), completing the long pivot to a pure Pest Control and Hygiene & Wellbeing company.

• Simplified the reporting structure into just two segments — North America and International — from 1 January 2025.

• Continued the satellite-branch rollout; ran a door-to-door sales pilot (judged a success as a pilot, with modest 2026 ambitions); introduced the Branch 360 “single pane of glass” management tool.

• Leadership transition: CEO Andy Ransom and Chair Richard Solomons both announced their departures; Paul Edgecliffe-Johnson joined as the new CFO.

VI. Financial analysis

After acquiring Terminix, a leader player in the US, the company is making moves to become more American and less from from the UK. They recently changed their functional currency to the USD, as North America represents around 60% of the revenue. The move makes sense as probably management wants to attract American capital and seek a valuation closer than Rollins.

The company has been involved in a mega-deal after acquiring Terminix and the synergies are below expectations. Large M&A is always harder than smaller acquisitions.

A decade ago, Rentokil had several non-core business and has disposed all of them focusing solely on pest control and hygiene. This has been a smart move and will allow the company to become more defensive.

However, the change to USD makes any comparative very challenging. To avoid any issues, I keep the historic figures until 2024 in GBPs, and add 3 years with the USD (reported by the company).

Revenue

Revenue has compounded steadily, with a step-change in 2022 from the Terminix acquisition.

• From £2.2bn in 2012 to £5.4bn in 2024 — a 7.7% CAGR — with the bulk of the growth coming in two phases: organic and bolt-on M&A (~6% per year) through to 2021, then a step-change with the Terminix deal in October 2022.

• Organic revenue growth in 2025 was 2.6% — at the low end of management’s medium-term 3-4% guidance — with North America at 2.2% and International at 3.7%. Pricing was the dominant component throughout 2024-25 as volumes proved soft in the early innings of post-deal integration.

• By segment the post-2022 transformation is total: Pest Control North America rose from £1.0 in 2021 to $3.2bn in 2024, while the formerly dominant Hygiene & Workwear category fell as France Workwear was carved out and other smaller assets divested.

View — Rentokil’s growth profile post-Terminix has been below pre-deal expectations. The Company guided for an Adjusted Operating Margin above 19% by FY2025 at the time of the deal announcement; FY2025 actual was 15.5%. The gap explains much of the share-price under-performance versus pre-deal expectations.

EBITDA and operating income

Margins have expanded substantially over the decade — from mid-teens to low-twenties — but remain below their post-deal trajectory targets.

• Adjusted EBITDA margin declined from 20.2% in 2016 to 14.9% in 2025

• Reported Operating Income (EBIT) of $720m in 2025 trails Adjusted Operating Profit of $1,070m by approximately $350m — this gap reflects amortisation of acquired intangibles (Terminix customer relationships, brands; ~$200-250m/year) and ongoing termite-damage litigation provisions.

View — The margin story is the central operational debate. Bulls point to the FY2025 second-half acceleration, the $100m cost-reduction programme on track, and the North-America branch consolidation (from 600 to ~400 branches by 2026) as evidence that the integration thesis is intact. Bears point out that 5 years post-deal-announcement Rentokil is still below the margin guidance set on Day 1.

Earnings and free cash flow

Free cash flow has been the most consistent positive in the post-deal financials — and is what has supported de-leveraging.

• FCF of $530m in 2025 was up 29% year on year, with a Free Cash Flow Conversion of 113% (ahead of guidance). Some of this was helped by real-estate disposals and one-off working-capital benefits, but the underlying conversion rate has been consistently strong.

• Reported net income in 2025 of ~$470m sits below the Adjusted measure because of non-cash amortization of acquired intangibles and the cash and provision impact of US termite-damage litigation.

• Net income is not an appropriate measure for this company as it’s impacted by non-cash items such as amortization of intangible assets that arise after acquiring a company.

Balance sheet

Leverage stepped up materially with the Terminix deal and is now de-leveraging.

• Net debt rose from £1.0bn at end-2021 to £2.7bn at end-2022 (Terminix completion). By the end of 2025 it had de-leveraged to ~$3.2bn. If we includ leases, the total net debt stands at $3.8bn and leverage ratio at 3.7x. The Company has $2.6bn of liquidity headroom, including $1bn of undrawn revolving credit facilities maturing in October 2029.

• Goodwill and intangibles together represent ~$7bn of the asset base — by far the largest single item — reflecting the cumulative consideration paid in Rentokil’s acquisitive growth, with Terminix being the largest single contributor. The Company has noted that goodwill impairment testing has not identified any need for write-downs to date.

• Currency mix of debt at year-end 2024: 63% USD, 21% EUR, 14% GBP, 1% other — reflecting deliberate hedging of debt against forecast operating profit by currency. The 2025 currency-presentation change to USD partly recognises this dollar-weighting of the balance sheet.

View — There are no obvious hidden assets and no flagged hidden liabilities. The asset-light operating model is buried under a heavy goodwill stack; investors should assess returns on cash flow and ROIC, not on book equity.

Capital allocation

Capital allocation since the Terminix deal has been dominated by integration and de-leveraging.

• Dividend per share has grown every year since 2015 in line with the Company’s progressive dividend policy, except for 2019 impacted by the global pandemic. FY2025 DPS was $0.1239 on the ordinary share (equivalent to ~$0.62 per ADR after the 5:1 ratio), up 3% YoY. Trailing dividend yield is approximately 1.6%.

• Share buybacks have been absent in this period — the Company has prioritised de-leveraging over buyback. With leverage now back to 2.6x and the goal of 2-2.5x in sight, capital-return optionality is expected to broaden from 2026.

• Bolt-on M&A has continued at a modest pace ($130-180m/year in 2023-25 vs $7.25bn in 2022), with eight deals in 2024 adding ~$60m of annualised revenue. Capex has stepped up post-deal to ~$430m/year, reflecting Terminix’s larger footprint and continued investment in digital platforms.

I believe company should do share buybacks instead of dividend, considering:

• There is no single majority shareholder that doesn’t allow for SBB

• Company is not overvalued, and once Terminix is fully integrated, it has the potential for a multiple re-rating closing the gap with Rollins (which will be a function of margins and growth)

• but, in the long-term, dividends can also offer a meaningful return to shareholders as they grew at a CAGR of 11% during the last 10 years.

Last, dilution to shareholders need to be considered as the company has financed some acquisitions with shares (e.g., Terminix), affecting the capital structure of the company.

On the positive side, the company increased capital when the stock was trading at high multiples.

Return on invested capital

ROIC has fallen materially post-deal and is the most important number to watch.

• Pre-Terminix Rentokil ROIC ran at ~12-13% in the 2018-2021 period — solid for a services company though below Rollins’ 20%+. Post-deal ROIC has compressed to ~6-7% as goodwill and intangibles ballooned the invested-capital denominator.

• Stripping out goodwill and intangibles gives a much higher operating ROIC (low-twenties), which is informative about the underlying operating-asset returns but is not the relevant number for shareholders — the goodwill is real money paid by the equity base.

• The recovery path: the Company’s stated targets imply ROIC recovery toward 10%+ over the medium term as integration completes, the cost programe delivers and margins step up toward 20-22%. This is the central operational debate for the equity story.

View — Six-percent ROIC is below the cost of capital for almost any reasonable assumption set. For Rentokil to be a value-creating investment from here, ROIC must move materially higher. The pre-Terminix history suggests the operating business is capable of high-teens unlevered returns; whether Mike Duffy can deliver that on the larger goodwill-heavy base is the headline question for the next 3-5 years

VII. Valuation

⚠️ Not Investment Recommendation⚠️

As of late May 2026, Rentokil’s NYSE ADR (ratio one ADR for five ordinary shares) traded at approximately $23.95. The implied market capitalization, enterprise value and trading multiples on FY2025 results are summarized below.

Read more

Today I’m starting a new section. I will present to you as many companies as I can from my watchlist. These are great companies that for whatever the reason (pricing, temporary issues, etc.), I don’t have in my portfolio.

With this new section I want to:

1. Learn and share it with the community these ideas with the purpose to extend knowledge and expanding the universe of potential companies joining the portfolio at some time.

2. Be ready to react when valuation adjusts, temporary issues seem over, etc.

As a new feature, at the end of the post I’m providing a basic financial model with the historical data that I will improve at each new research. Note I’m just including historical data to not influence the way to project financials - that’s something each investor should do, but I’m always happy to give a hand if necessary.

I’m introducing a new concept: the Asymmetric Test, by which I evaluate if a company is interesting if:

1. Provides an essential or high-value product - Aiming for companies that sell products or services that are essential, irreplicable of high-value.

2. Sole provider or oligpoly, avoiding industries with lot of competition

3. Huge barriers to entry, the moat protecting the competitive advantages

4. Low risk of disruption. I can’t predict who will be the winner in the AI revolution, but I know that the company we are analyzing today will not be disrupted (but will probably be positively impacted)

5. High earnings power and strong track record of growth, avoiding volatile businesses

6. Last, but not least, acquired at a low or reasonable valuation. Companies like this do not trade in the value territory, so I’m adding the reasonable term.

Hope you enjoy this new section, that kicks-off with one of the best and most boring companies out there:

Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

Executive Summary

Rollins, Inc. is the parent of Orkin and a family of pest-control brands that together form the second-largest pest-management company in the world and one of the two largest in the United States.

The business is simple to describe and unusually durable: it sends trained technicians to roughly 2.8 million homes and commercial sites to keep insects, rodents and termites away, mostly on recurring contracts, through more than 800 company-owned and franchised locations across some 70 countries

Over the last decade the financial pattern has been remarkably consistent.

• Revenue grew from about $1.57 billion in 2016 to $3.76 billion in 2025 — a compound rate near 10% and, by the Company’s own count, a 24th consecutive year of revenue growth

• EBITDA margins widened modestly over the same period, from roughly 20% to about 23%

• Net income compounded in the mid-teens, free cash flow consistently exceeded reported earnings, and returns on invested capital settled in the low-twenties percent

• Leverage is light, at roughly 0.6x net debt to EBITDA at the end of 2025

The industry around Rollins is large, slow-growing and highly fragmented.

• Estimates of the global pest-control services market cluster around $26–30 billion, growing in the mid-single digits, with thousands of small operators below a short list of consolidators

• That structure is the heart of the Rollins model: organic growth from price and route density, supplemented by a steady stream of bolt-on acquisitions. The principal listed peer, the UK’s Rentokil Initial, became the U.S. market leader after buying Terminix in 2022

The debate among investors is not about business quality but about price.

• Rollins has traded for years at a large premium to the market and to its own peer — recently around 48–50x trailing earnings and roughly 31–32x EBITDA — even as the share price drifted lower through 2025 and into 2026

• A soft fourth quarter of 2025 (weather-affected) and an FTC order on employee non-compete agreements have added near-term noise

I. Introduction

What the company does, where it is located, and the industry it operates in

Rollins, Inc. provides pest, termite and wildlife control services to residential, commercial and franchise customers. Its operating brand portfolio is led by Orkin, and includes HomeTeam Pest Defense, Clark, Northwest, Western, Waltham, OPC, IFC, McCall, PermaTreat, Crane, MissQuito, Trutech, Critter Control, Fox Pest Control (acquired 2023) and Saela (acquired 2025), as well as international brands such as Orkin Canada, Orkin Australia, Safeguard (UK) and Aardwolf (Singapore).

The Company is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, at 2170 Piedmont Road NE, listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker ROL, and is a constituent of the S&P 500. As of December 2025 it employed roughly 21,900 people across more than 800 company-owned and franchised locations in about 70 countries; about 90% of revenue is generated in the United States, with the balance from a long tail of international markets.

Company history

The Company traces its origins to Rollins Broadcasting, founded in 1948 by brothers O. Wayne and John W. Rollins. The pivotal event in its corporate history was the 1964 acquisition of Orkin Exterminating Company — at that time one of the larger leveraged acquisitions in U.S. corporate history — which transformed the holding company into a pest-control operator. The parent was renamed Rollins, Inc. in 1965 and has traded on the NYSE since 1968

Over the following six decades, Rollins expanded principally by acquisition: dozens of regional and specialty brands have been folded into the group while operating largely under their own names — a deliberate strategy that preserves local brand equity in a service category where reputation travels by word of mouth. In 2024 and 2025 alone, the Company completed 26 acquisitions, including Saela Holdings (2025) for $207.2 million in cash and commercial paper.

II. Business model

What the company does

Rollins is a route-based service operator. Pest-control technicians drive an assigned route of homes and businesses, perform an inspection-and-treatment service per visit, and book the work against multi-period contracts. Roughly three-quarters of revenue is recurring (contracted, repeat-cycle visits), about a tenth is ancillary (mosquito, wildlife, attic insulation, related add-ons) and the remainder is one-time termite or initial-treatment work. The franchise programme adds 131 domestic and 66 international agreements that pay royalties on the franchise base.

Segment analysis

Rollins reports a single operating segment but discloses revenue across three service offerings:

• Residential pest control — recurring services to single-family homes against insects, rodents and wildlife. The largest line and the most recession-resistant: roughly 45% of total revenue in 2025, growing at high-single-digit / low-double-digit rates and supported by aging U.S. housing stock and rising consumer focus on hygiene.

• Commercial pest control — workplace pest and rodent control for restaurants, food processors, hospitals, hotels and logistics customers, including specialised lines such as bird control. About a third of revenue; mix-shifted to non-discretionary categories where pest management is a regulatory and reputational necessity rather than a preference.

• Termite & ancillary — termite treatment and prevention (Sentricon baiting, liquid soil treatments, wood treatments), termite pretreatment work supplied to homebuilders through HomeTeam and Northwest, plus mosquito control, attic insulation and franchise-related revenue. The fastest-growing of the three (14% in 2024, double-digit in 2025) and one of the highest-margin.

The three lines are different in seasonality and elasticity but share the same field workforce and route economics, which is part of why Rollins runs them as one segment.

Geography has been remarkably stable: international has hovered around 7% of revenue across the period, growing roughly in line with the U.S. business. The Company has consistently described the U.S. as its core market and international as a long-term option.

The economic engine common to all three lines is route density. Because a technician’s day is dominated by drive time, packing more nearby accounts onto each route lowers cost per visit and lifts margins; this is why local market share, branch network coverage and acquisition of nearby small operators are central to the strategy. The proprietary BOSS field-operating system feeds technician routing, scheduling, billing and customer history, and is treated by the Company as a core piece of operating infrastructure.

Two pieces of infrastructure quietly drive the franchise.

• Brand portfolio. Orkin is among the most recognised names in the category, supported by decades of advertising spend (advertising expense $128.5 million in 2025; $119.6 million in 2024). Recognition lowers customer-acquisition cost; the multi-brand approach lets Rollins serve different price points and channels without cannibalising Orkin.

• Route density. Once a market is densely populated with accounts, each new account is cheaper to serve than the average, which improves margins as a route fills out. Density also creates a local cost advantage for the leader that single-van entrants cannot match on a route-by-route basis. This is a key ratio for the industry, the cost-to-serve.

Main customers

Rollins serves more than 2.8 million customers across three buckets:

• Residential. Mass-market homeowners and renters. The unit economics are small per account ($30–$50 per visit typically) but the cohort is very large and high-retention. There is no concentration risk: even the largest residential account is a rounding error in revenue.

• Commercial. Food-service, food-processing, hospitality, healthcare, education, logistics and property-management customers. Many of these are bound by health-code and audit requirements that make routine pest service a compliance line, not a discretionary one. Contracts are typically multi-year and renew at high rates.

• Franchise & other. Rollins franchises certain Orkin operations domestically and internationally (131 domestic, 66 international agreements), generating royalty income, and runs small specialty lines (Trutech, Critter Control wildlife). This segment is small but capital-light.

No single customer is material to the whole. The diffuse, contract-based customer book — millions of small recurring relationships rather than a few large ones — is itself a source of stability: revenue does not hinge on any one account, and high retention rates across the industry (peers cite mid-80s percent) mean the installed base compounds quietly from year to year.

The company has multiple ways to cross-selling its services as there are many different issues arising in a house, which are impacted by different insects.

In commercial segment, there are clear tailwinds from regulation, brand reputation, etc. It’s reputation, potential lawsuits, inventory write offs, etc. It’s not worth not having Rollins doing the service.

One of the most resilient companies on earth

This chart summarizes why Rollins trades at a premium multiple over many companies: 25 consecutive years of revenue growth.

• In the Great Financial Crisis: +10%

• Covid pandemic: +12%

In a crisis, people stop buying unnecessary things, but will keep using Rollins services. As simple as that.

III. Industry overview

Market size and how the industry is evolving

Pest control is a large, mature and slowly growing services market.

• Independent estimates vary with scope and definition, but the global pest-control services market is generally placed in the region of $26–30 billion in 2024–2025, with projected compound growth in the mid-single digits (roughly 5–6.5%) out to the early 2030s

• North America generated about $9.5 billion in 2024 revenue and is forecast to reach roughly $16.5 billion by 2034 (~6% CAGR), making it the largest single region (~36% of the global market)

• The U.S. market specifically is sized at roughly $23–29 billion across providers, with the same mid-single-digit growth profile

Growth drivers are structural and unglamorous — but the data behind them is concrete.

• Urbanisation and housing density. Per the U.S. Census Bureau, roughly 80–83% of the U.S. population already lives in urban areas, with forecasts pointing to ~89% by 2050; there are around 131 million occupied housing units in the country, an aging stock that creates ongoing pest-entry points. Multi-family housing and high-density living facilitate pest spread between connected structures

• Climate change and lengthening pest seasons. The CDC reports more than 1.6 million U.S. cases of mosquito-, tick- and flea-borne disease between 2004 and 2023, and uses Lyme disease as an EPA climate-change indicator. Warmer winters and longer summers extend tick and mosquito activity windows and push their geographic range northward; termite ranges are also expanding

• Tightening hygiene and food-safety regulation. Audit-driven commercial demand from food-service and healthcare customers continues to grow, particularly post-COVID, with surveys showing 85–90% of consumers more attentive to hygiene in public spaces.

• Shift from DIY to professional service. In residential, the long-running migration from do-it-yourself sprays to contracted professional service supports volume growth on top of which operators layer annual price increases.

None of these drivers is dramatic on its own, but together they support steady volume growth on top of which operators layer annual price increases.

Why customers buy, how critical the service is, and what that means for pricing power.

• Why they buy. On the commercial side, pest control is a compliance and reputation line — a positive rodent or insect finding can shut down a restaurant, fail a food-safety audit or trigger headlines for a healthcare facility, making the service close to non-discretionary. On the residential side, the work delivers protection-of-the-home value (peace of mind, prevention of termite or rodent damage) where the annual cost is modest relative to the asset being protected.

• How critical. The cost of a pest-control contract is small relative to the cost of failure. A termite infestation can cause structural damage to a home that, according to the Company’s own materials, sums to roughly $5 billion in U.S. property damage each year, most of it not covered by homeowner insurance. A commercial pest incident can mean a temporary closure. The asymmetry — small recurring fee versus large potential downside — anchors customer willingness to pay and supports retention.

• Pricing power. Rollins has been able to take low-to-mid-single-digit annual price increases without unusual churn. Organic revenue growth ran in the high-single digits through 2024–2025 with most of the contribution from pricing and the balance from volume / cross-sell. Adjusted EBITDA margins widened from roughly 20% in 2016 to ~23% in 2025, consistent with pricing exceeding cost inflation. The diffuse customer base — no single account is material — gives the Company leverage when re-pricing.

The most important structural feature, for an investor, is fragmentation. The United States alone is served by roughly 32,700 pest-control firms (per industry estimates), the great majority small, single-branch local operators, with median annual revenue around $400,000. Only a handful of companies have national scale. That long tail is the raw material for consolidation, and it is why the largest players can grow faster than the underlying market by acquiring routes year after year.

Competitors: an oligopoly at the top of a fragmented base

The competitive structure is best described as a fragmented market with a consolidated top. At the apex sit two listed leaders and a small number of large international or private players; beneath them lies the long tail of local firms.[33]

Listed leaders.

• Rentokil Initial plc (LSE: RTO). UK-listed and the global #1 by revenue (~£5 billion in 2024). Acquired Terminix in October 2022 to become the largest pest-control operator in the U.S. by route count, then spent 2023–25 working through a complex integration. Rentokil EV/EBITDA has tracked roughly half of Rollins for the past two years, partly reflecting weaker organic momentum and integration cost.

• Rollins, Inc. (NYSE: ROL). Cleaner business mix (more residential and small-commercial), no comparable large acquisition to digest, and consistently higher margins (~23% adjusted EBITDA vs. high-teens for Rentokil). Trades at a premium reflecting this.

Non-listed competitors of note.

• Anticimex. Privately held, owned by EQT, sizable European footprint with a growing North American business. Known for a digital/Internet-of-Things-enabled commercial offering.

• Truly Nolen, Aptive Environmental, Massey Services and roughly 32,000 local independents. The long-tail competition. Individually small, collectively large; the substrate of the M&A roll-up.

Competitive advantages

Rollins competes on three advantages, all of which compound over time.

• Brand portfolio. Orkin is one of the most recognised category brands in the U.S.; recognition lowers customer-acquisition cost and reduces residential price sensitivity. The multi-brand strategy lets Rollins reach different price points and acquire local champions without cannibalising Orkin.

• Route density. Local market share is the single most important driver of route economics. As accounts cluster, drive time per visit falls, technicians become more productive and margins expand. This is a competitive advantage held by the local leader in each market — Rollins is the local leader in a large share of its markets — but it is created and re-created continuously by good operations.

• M&A engine. Three decades of disciplined small-deal acquisition (94 acquisitions in the last three years, including a step-up to Saela in 2025) is, in the Company’s own framing, the mechanism by which the leaders compound faster than the underlying market. Pricing on these deals is generally not disclosed in detail but appears to fall in a multi-of-cash-flow band well below where Rollins’ own equity trades, creating real value when integrated.

Is there a moat, and what could erode it?

A moat — a structural barrier to entry, not just an operating advantage — does exist here, but it is narrower than the headline competitive advantages suggest.

What constitutes the moat. The combination of:

• (a) customer switching cost — once a homeowner is on an annual contract with a technician who knows the property, switching is friction-rich for a small absolute saving (but, let’s be honest, this is a modest barrier);

• (b) brand trust at point of decision, which is unusually concentrated in Orkin; and

• (c) national scale across thousands of routes that no single local entrant can match. Each piece is modest; the durability is in how slowly any of them erodes.

What is not the moat. Local route density, technician training and BOSS scheduling are operating advantages, not moat f9eatures in the strict sense — a well-run competitor in a given market can build them too. They underwrite returns; they do not by themselves prevent entry.

The risks to the moat are worth stating plainly.

• Barriers to entry at the small end are low — a van, a licence and a sprayer will start a local firm — so the threat is not a single disruptive entrant but ongoing margin competition at the bottom.

• Rentokil has the scale and capital to match many of Rollins’ advantages and is the credible peer challenger in the U.S.; integration noise has been a tailwind to Rollins, but that is not permanent.

• The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s 2025 order narrowing post-employment non-compete restrictions could, over time, increase technician mobility and modestly raise the cost of retaining experienced field labour, particularly at the commercial end

  • Climate variability cuts both ways: longer pest seasons and expanded ranges add demand, but unusually warm or wet quarters can also pull demand forward and create the kind of weather-driven quarterly volatility that hit fourth-quarter 2025.

IV. The management

Key executives, backgrounds and reputation

Jerry E. Gahlhoff, Jr. — President & Chief Executive Officer. Gahlhoff became CEO in January 2023 after serving as President and COO. He is a trained entomologist and a career operator in pest control, having joined Rollins through the HomeTeam Pest Defense business; he is regarded internally and externally as a domain expert who rose through operations rather than finance.

The separation of the CEO role from the Chairmanship — formalised when he became CEO — is viewed by the board as appropriate governance.

Kenneth D. Krause — Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer. Krause joined as CFO in September 2022 from MSA Safety, where he had been Senior Vice President, CFO, Chief Strategy Officer and Treasurer; before that he held finance leadership roles at MSA dating to 2006. He brings public-company finance and capital-allocation experience and has been associated with a sharper focus on margin, free-cash-flow conversion and disciplined leverage since arriving; he features prominently in the Company’s investor communications on profitability.

John F. Wilson — Executive Chairman; Gary W. Rollins — Executive Chairman Emeritus. Wilson, a long-tenured Rollins executive, serves as Executive Chairman. Gary W. Rollins — a member of the founding family who led the Company as CEO from 2001 to 2022 and oversaw much of its modern compounding — remains Executive Chairman Emeritus.

The leadership structure deliberately keeps the founding family close to the board while leaving day-to-day operations with a professional, operator-CEO.

Reputationally, the management team is generally well regarded for operational consistency and conservative finance; the principal external critique is not of competence but of the stock’s valuation. The board added experienced outside directors in recent years (including search and governance specialist Dale Jones, and Lead Independent Director Louise S. Sams), which is consistent with a maturing governance posture at a founder-controlled company.

Ownership and skin in the game

Ownership is the defining governance fact at Rollins.

• The founding Rollins family — principally through Gary W. Rollins, family members and the family holding vehicle LOR, Inc. — has historically controlled approximately 38% of the shares outstanding. This is a controlled company in substance: the family’s vote effectively determines major board decisions, and major capital actions have repeatedly involved family liquidity events.

• Two large secondary offerings have moved family stock into broader hands: a 2023 sale of 38.7 million shares at $35.00 (with the Company repurchasing 8.72 million shares for ~$300 million at $34.39), and a 2025 sale of 17.4 million shares at $57.50 (with the Company repurchasing 3.48 million shares for ~$200 million at $56.93). These transactions reduced the family’s percentage stake somewhat but left it firmly in control.

• Day-to-day executives (Gahlhoff, Krause) hold meaningful but not controlling stakes built through annual equity grants. Insider transactions in 2024 and 2025 have been overwhelmingly programmatic sales (10b5-1 plan distributions of vested stock) rather than open-market purchases or sales — there has been no notable CEO or CFO open-market buying in 2025–26.[43]

Compensation and alignment of interests

Executive pay follows a conventional three-part structure:

• Base salary. A modest fixed component; for the CEO it has been around $1 million per year. Salary is not the principal lever of alignment.

• Annual performance-based cash incentive (bonus). The plan divides the bonus into two components, each tied to a financial target. Per the Company’s own bonus-plan documentation, the Pre-Tax Profit-to-Plan component pays up to a maximum of 90% of annual salary if profit reaches or exceeds the Board-approved annual plan (with pro-rata payment between 95% and 100% of plan), and the Revenue-Growth-to-Plan component pays up to 60% of annual salary on the same scale. No bonus is paid under any component if the Company’s pre-tax profit does not improve year-on-year — a ‘circuit-breaker’ that ties the bonus to absolute earnings progress, not just plan achievement. The combined maximum cash bonus is therefore 150% of salary

• Equity-based awards. The largest part of the package: restricted stock and performance-share units vesting over 3–4 years on a mix of time- and performance-conditions (revenue growth, EPS growth, total shareholder return). For both the CEO and CFO, equity has been the dominant share of total reported compensation; the Company does not currently grant stock options.

Reported pay for the two operating executives looks like this (fiscal 2024, per the 2025 Proxy Statement and parsed regulatory data):

• CEO Jerry Gahlhoff — total compensation ~$8.2 million for fiscal 2024 (estimated by Quiver Quantitative from the Company’s 2025 DEF14A: ~$6.7 million in fiscal 2023 and ~$9.0 million in fiscal 2025), with the substantial majority delivered in equity awards. The CEO pay-mix is salary in the low-millions, two-component cash bonus (capped at 150% of salary), and the remainder in performance-conditioned stock — i.e. the operator’s outcome is more sensitive to the share price than to either his salary or his bonus.

• CFO Kenneth Krause — total compensation ~$4.2 million for fiscal 2024 (roughly $0.77 million salary, $0.78 million cash bonus and ~$2.6 million in stock awards, with no stock options) — a mix in which equity again clearly dominates.

Stock-ownership guidelines reinforce the equity emphasis: the CEO is required to hold Company stock with a value equal to six times base salary, the CFO three times, with five years to comply.

Recent insider trading

Insider activity over the last 24 months has been dominated by family secondary sales (Gary W. Rollins voting trusts and Randall Rollins voting trusts collectively reducing positions through registered offerings), and by programmatic small disposals by named officers under 10b5-1 plans. There has been no material open-market buying by the CEO, CFO or COO in 2024–26, and disposals by named officers have been small in dollar terms relative to their remaining stakes — net, a ‘no signal’ read.

Sources: Rollins, Inc. Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) filed March 13, 2025; 2023 Executive Bonus Agreement (Justia public archive of Company filing); Quiver Quantitative parsing of 2025 DEF14A; SEC Form 4 filings via GuruFocus and StockTitan.

V. Financial analysis

6.1 Revenue

Rollins’ revenue line is the cleanest part of the story.

• Total revenue compounded from $1.57 billion in 2016 to $3.76 billion in 2025 — a 9.8% CAGR over nine years and a 24th consecutive year of revenue growth by the Company’s count.

• Growth has been a mix of price, volume and acquisitions. The Company discloses an ‘organic’ revenue measure (excluding revenue from the trailing 12 months of acquisitions): organic growth has run at 7–9% through most of 2024 and 2025, with M&A adding 2–3 points on top.

• By segment, termite and ancillary has been the fastest-growing line (14% YoY in 2024, double digit in 2025), supported by Sentricon baiting and HomeTeam pretreatment work; residential and commercial each compound in the 9–11% range.

• By geography, growth has been remarkably balanced: US and international both compounded at ~11.7% over 2020–25; international remained ~7% of total revenue throughout.

Price-versus-volume disclosure is not fully granular, but Company commentary on quarterly calls is consistent with most of the organic growth in 2024–25 having come from pricing rather than account count — i.e. customers are paying more per visit, with modest underlying account growth. This is the textbook signature of a route-density business with limited cyclical exposure.[51]

EBITDA and operating income

Margins have expanded slowly and steadily.

• EBITDA margin (Revenue + Cost of services + SG&A + restructuring, in the model’s negative-expense convention; equivalent to the GAAP gross-profit-less-SG&A construct) widened from roughly 20% in 2016 to about 23% in 2025, on revenue that has more than doubled.

• Operating margin followed: from ~17% in 2016 to ~19% in 2025.

• The path was not perfectly linear — FY2019 saw a non-cash pension settlement, FY2022 included property-disposal gains, FY2023 carried a $5.2 million restructuring charge, FY2025 saw insurance-claim noise — but the underlying trend is up.

Rollins’ own ‘Adjusted EBITDA’ (which adds back acquisition-related items) ran at 22.8% of revenue in 2024 and ~23% in 2025; the Company’s own framing of margin progression is therefore very close to the GAAP-based picture, which is a sign of low non-GAAP intensity by U.S. large-cap standards.[54]

Earnings and free cash flow

Earnings and cash flow tell the same story as revenue and margin, only better.

• Net income rose from $167 million in 2016 to $527 million in 2025 — a 13.6% CAGR — and diluted EPS from $0.34 to $1.09 on a share count that is essentially flat (split-adjusted) over the period.

• Free cash flow (CFO less capex) has consistently exceeded reported net income — a quality marker. FY2025 free cash flow was about $650 million on net income of $527 million, an FCF conversion ratio of 123%.

• Capex is structurally light — under 1% of revenue — because the business is essentially routes and people rather than fixed plant. Working-capital absorption is modest given the recurring billing model.

• Stock-based compensation is small relative to FCF ($40 million in 2025 vs. $650 million FCF); on the firm’s preferred ‘Asymmetric Ventures’ definition (CFO less capex less SBC), FCF was about $610 million in 2025.

This is part of the family’s 2023 and 2025 secondary sales: cash-flow conversion above 100% of net income is a recurring feature and a guidance point for 2026.

Balance sheet

The balance sheet is conservative.

• Net debt at the end of 2025 was about $510 million against EBITDA of about $851 million — roughly 0.6x — and the Company’s own leverage ratio (which capitalises leases) stood near 0.9x.[59]

• Debt is modest and well-termed, including a $500 million senior note due 2035 and a commercial-paper program backed by a $1.0 billion revolving facility. The Company has at times operated in a net-cash position (2022) and has comfortably re-levered to fund acquisitions and buybacks since.

Two balance-sheet nuances are worth flagging for completeness.

• Goodwill and intangibles are large relative to total assets — an arithmetic consequence of a business built by acquiring hundreds of companies — so reported book equity is not a meaningful guide to value, and tangible capital is small.

• Off-balance-sheet and contingent items are ordinary-course: operating-lease obligations (captured in the leverage ratio); routine litigation and insurance reserves; an environmental matter in California settled in 2025; and the FTC non-compete order, which the Company expects to be immaterial financially. Earn-out and contingent-consideration liabilities arise from the acquisition programme but are individually small.

View — There are no obvious hidden assets and no alarming hidden liabilities. The asset-light, goodwill-heavy structure is exactly what one expects from a serial acquirer of service routes; the key point is that the returns must be judged on cash flow and ROIC, not on book equity.

6.5 Capital allocation

Capital returns to shareholders have been steady, growing and disciplined.

• Dividends per share have grown every year of the decade, from $0.222 in 2016 to $0.6775 in 2025 — a 13.2% CAGR. The trailing dividend yield at recent share prices is approximately 1.2–1.3%, modest in absolute terms but reflecting that the stock trades at a low free-cash-flow yield. A special dividend in 2020 (during the pandemic) is the only step in the otherwise smooth growth pattern

• The payout ratio (dividends divided by net income) has hovered in the 55–63% range across the decade — a high but stable share of earnings — and the dividend-to-FCF ratio is lower (49% in 2025) reflecting FCF in excess of net income.

• Share repurchases have been event-driven, not programmatic: small amounts in most years ($8–11 million for net-of-tax-related buying), with two large bursts coinciding with the family secondary offerings — $315 million in 2023 (8.72 million shares at ~$34.39 average) and $217 million in 2025 (3.48 million shares at ~$56.93 average). Outside those two windows, the buyback has not been a meaningful capital-return lever.

• Together, dividends and buybacks have absorbed about 67% of cumulative free cash flow from 2018–25; acquisitions account for most of the balance, with very modest organic capex.

Notes: Free cash flow defined as CFO less capex. The 2023 % of FCF exceeds 100% because the $315 million repurchase was funded partly with new debt; the 2025 figure reflects a similar but smaller pattern.

M&A is one of the core engines of value creation. The company acquires companies significantly below their premium valuation, instantaneously creating value through multiple re-rating.

Return on invested capital

Returns on capital are the clearest quantitative signature of business quality, and here Rollins scores well.

• On the model’s definition — NOPAT over invested capital (operating working capital plus net property, right-of-use assets, goodwill and intangibles) — ROIC rose from about 19% in 2019 to roughly 22–23% in recent years, settling near 22.4% in 2025.

• Stripping out goodwill and intangibles, the return on tangible operating capital is in the triple digits — the natural consequence of a goodwill-heavy serial acquirer.

• ROIC has held up while the business has grown from $2 billion of revenue to $3.8 billion, which is the harder feat: many acquisitive businesses see returns drift down as the average deal becomes less differentiated. Rollins has avoided that, partly because it has remained disciplined on deal pricing and partly because the underlying single-route economics remain attractive.

VI. Valuation

Rollins is a textbook example of a high-quality business carrying a high-quality price tag.

As of late May 2026, the shares traded around the low-$50s. The table below sets out the resulting market capitalisation, enterprise value and implied multiples on trailing 2025 results.

Multiples in context.

• These are premium multiples by almost any yardstick. They sit well above the broad market and far above the listed peer: Rentokil Initial has for some time traded at EV/sales and EV/EBITDA multiples roughly half of Rollins’, reflecting Rollins’ higher margins, cleaner focus and more consistent organic growth, as well as Rentokil’s post-Terminix integration challenges.

• On a historical basis, Rollins’ own EV/EBITDA has ranged from the high-teens to the high-40s over the past decade, with a median around the low-30s — so the current multiple is near, not above, its own long-run norm even after the 2025–26 de-rating.

• The share price tells its own story. Rollins de-rated through 2025 and into 2026: a weather-affected fourth quarter of 2025 (revenue and EPS just below expectations) triggered a sharp one-day fall, and the stock spent early 2026 in the low-to-mid-$50s, near the bottom of its 52-week range, even as the business kept compounding (Q1 2026 revenue grew about 10% with organic growth in the mid-single digits). Sell-side price targets cluster in the mid-$60s with a generally constructive but not uniform rating mix.

Sources: Market-data and valuation providers (stockanalysis.com, GuruFocus, Robinhood), accessed May 2026; published sell-side price targets; Rentokil Initial disclosures; author’s model; Rollins results releases.

VII. The Asymmetric Ventures Test

Up to this point the study has been neutral and explanatory. This final section is explicitly evaluative: it applies the firm’s six-criterion Asymmetric Ventures framework, grades each criterion PASS / PARTIAL / FAIL, and concludes with an overall verdict. The grading is the author’s judgement; the supporting facts remain footnoted to primary sources.

Criterion-by-criterion assessment

(a) Essential or high-value product — PASS.

Pest control is close to non-discretionary, especially on the commercial side. For food processors, restaurants, hospitals, hotels and logistics operators, pest management is a regulatory and reputational necessity, not a luxury; failure carries shutdown and liability risk. For households the cost is modest and the value (protection of the home, peace of mind) is high relative to price. The work is recurring and out of sight when it works, which is precisely why customers keep paying.

(b) Sole provider or part of an oligopoly — PARTIAL.

This is the criterion Rollins fits least neatly. The pest-control market is highly fragmented — thousands of small local operators in the U.S. alone — with only a handful of scaled players on top: Rollins, Rentokil (which absorbed Terminix in 2022), Ecolab in commercial, and the private consolidator Anticimex. So there is an oligopoly, but only at the top of a fragmented base, and Rollins is one of two leaders rather than half of a true duopoly.

(c) Huge barriers to entry — PARTIAL.

Entering pest control at the small end is easy — a van, a sprayer and a licence. The barriers that matter are at scale: national brand (Orkin’s recognition is hard to replicate), route density (locked in by years of acquired share), the BOSS technology platform, and the trained-technician workforce. None of these is impossible to replicate; together they are very hard to replicate at national scale within a useful timeframe. The 2025 FTC non-compete order modestly weakens the technician-mobility component.

Partial pass: high barriers at the top of the market, low barriers at the bottom. On the other hand, today everybody seems to be focused on technology, rather than boring businesses like this one.

(d) Low risk of disruption — PASS.

Pest control is one of the lowest-disruption-risk services one can find. The work has to be done physically, on-site, by a person who can find and treat the actual infestation; there is no plausible software substitute. New baiting and monitoring technologies (digital traps, IoT sensors) are tools for pest-control operators, not substitutes for them. Pest behaviour and biology change slowly. A 10-year forward view of the industry looks much like the current one, only larger.

Clean pass: this is a low-tech, slow-moving, route-based service category, which is exactly what the framework rewards.

(e) High earnings power and demonstrated track record — PASS.

The pricing power is real: Rollins has taken low-to-mid-single-digit price increases consistently with minimal churn, and adjusted EBITDA margins have widened from ~20% in 2016 to ~23% in 2025. The track record is the most impressive part: ten years of mid-teens earnings compounding, free cash flow consistently above reported net income, and ROIC settling around 22%. Twenty-four consecutive years of revenue growth, per the Company.

Clean pass: earnings power demonstrated through a multi-year price-up cycle and through both economic expansions and the COVID disruption.

(f) Acquired at a low or reasonable valuation. As of late May 2026 Rollins traded in the low-$50s for a market capitalisation in the mid-$20-billion range — roughly 48–50x trailing earnings, about 31–32x EV/EBITDA, and the low-40s on free cash flow.

That is a large premium to the market and roughly double the multiple of its listed peer Rentokil. Even after de-rating through 2025–26, the multiple sits near the middle of Rollins’ own historical range rather than at a trough.

A company like this deserves a premium, but 40+ times FCF leads to no margin of safety at all if growth for whatever the reason starts to slowdown.

Overall verdict

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Uber Q1 2026: Reading the Quarter

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Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

Introduction

• Antin trades at 11x EV/FCFF, yet is a high quality company providing stable and predictable cash flows.

• It’s an illiquid company, which explains part of the discount in valuation, with a free float of 16% (currently less than €400m potentially available in the market)

• Company will start a new fundraising cycle this year which should contribute to an uplift in AUM and earnings

• Current stock price provides margin of safety (company should be trading at least 20% higher), and in the meantime, it delivers a solid and sustainable 7% dividend yield.

• Investing in Antin today is like investing in an investment grade bond yielding 7% per year, which is in line with past market performance, but without the risk that passive investors face with indexes valuations at all time highs.

• Antin passes our Asymmetric test and represents ~5% of the portfolio.

I. Antin in a Nutshell

Antin Infrastructure Partners is a private equity company focused on infrastructure companies across Europe and North America.

The company focuses on infrastructure companies withing transport, energy & environmental, digital and social sectores.

Antin manages three different strategies:

• Flagship — The core strategy with the first fund launched 20 years ago. It current has ~€18.6bn of fee-earning assets under management (AUM). Last fund reached €10bn size.

• Mid-cap — A new strategy launched in 2021 focusing on mid-market infrastructure investments. As the Flagship strategy becomes larger and can’t target mid-market companies, the firm launched this fund to continue investing in this segment.

• NextGen — Strategy launched also in 2021 that invests in new businesses and technologies that require capital to scale.

Antin effectively covers the entire segment in the infrastructure space, from newer companies/technologies to very large investments.

Current investments are concentrated in the digital infrastructure space (fiber companies, data centers, etc.), and energy & environment (district energy, renewables, etc.).

Antin applies what they call the “Infrastructure Test”, which are the main characteristics that their investments need to comply:

1. Provide as essential service to the community

2. Exhibit significant barriers to market entry

3. Have stable and predictable cash flows, that are inflation-linked

4. Display robust downside protection, mostly insulated from the business cycle.

The industry of private equity has concentrated over the last decade, with major companies acquiring asset management companies and consolidating the industry. Antin ranks as the 9th largest asset manager and is currently in a good position with very large funds.

During the next decade there is a risk of Antin being acquired by one of the largest managers as the industry keeps consolidating.

Since inception in 2007, AUM have increased from €0.2bn to €33.8bn AUM:

• The Flagship strategy has increased from €1.0bn in 2008 to €10bn in 2022.

• New strategies launched to effectively cover a larger share of the infrastructure market

In the private equity, performance is key an Antin has achieved an investment performance of 22% gross IRR and a 2.5x Gross Multiple.

• However, it’s not only performance in terms of delivered IRR what matters, but also how long you take to deploy the committed capital and to return it back to investors.

• During the last years, this investment activity slew down, as 2022 marked one of the most challenging years in the history of the PE industry. From very high valuations, to a disruption in financial markets with rates increasing exponentially in a few quarters.

The company went public in 2021 at a valuation that was very high. Final IPO price was set at €24 per share, implying a P/E of ~33x and nearly 40x actual earnings. The stock reached an insane valuation of €34.5 per share during 2021 and today the stock trades at ~€10 per share.

• I started investing in March 2024, with multiple further acquisitions during 2024 and 2025, implying an average cost of €11.4 per share.

• Stock is down 12%, but the investment is only 6% down, as the company offers a 6-7% dividen yield.

Summary of the investment thesis

A forgotten company?

Antin has not performed as I expected when I first invested in 2024. This was mainly a mistake I made, as looking backwards, I should have factored an extended fundraising cycle. This has created uncertainties, and given the illiquidity of the stock, it looks that it’s becoming a forgotten stock.

• The firm was slow in deploying capital, which turns to be a positive signal as the investment committees seem to be focused on performance, rather than simply investing capital to earn management fees.

• During the last quarters, investment performance has accelerated, with the Flagship fund close to 75% of capital invested, and the Mid-cap strategy almost ready.

• Currently, the company is launching multiple sell-side process to exit matures companies of older funds. This will support the new fundraising cycle.

• For many quarters, executives avoided to give specific timings on fundraising, due to the uncertainties on investment performance (investments and exits). A reasonable approach to not overpromise and the under-deliver.

The market now is not looking into the details.

• New fundraising cycle begins at the end of 2026, which will effectively increase the AUM significantly during the next 3 years

• The cycle is supported by exits, which will trigger the first carried interest attributable to the company — an important milestone, although not material at this stage (~€50m in the next couple years)

• Earnings will increase in the next years, supporting not only strong cash flow generation but also the current high dividend distributions.

Antin is like buying an investment grade bond offering a 7% coupon. It’s very attractive, yet nobody seem to care

• Current DPS stands at €0.7 per share, representing a dividend yield of 7%

• This dividend is sustainable as cash generation sufficiently covers this pay-out

• During the next years, company will invest ~1% in its own funds (GP Commitment), but current cash and exits will provide cushion to not put at risk the dividend.

• Note that share buybacks are not a viable alternative due to the current illiquidity of the stock.

However, it’s more than just a simple bond. There is high margin of safety and potential high upside.

• The stock trades at 12x earnings, a low valuation for a high-quality business that provides stable cash flows over extended periods of time.

• In the private markets you will never see an asset management company with €30bn of AUM trading at 12x earnings and 7.4x EBITDA.

• There will be growth in earnings over the next years through the new fundraising cycle. While value might take time to come, the increasing cash flow generation will support the current 7% dividend yield.

II. 2026 Update on the Investment Thesis

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Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The …

Read more

Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

One of the readers recommended to take a look to Azelis, IMCD’s main rival. I love receiving suggestions from all of you, so I took it seriously.

Here is an analysis of Azelis. I’m not covering any more the sector, and business model analysis will be shorter than IMCD as some things are common to both companies. You can fin the prior analysis here:

I. Introduction to Azelis

I.I Introduction

Azelis is the second largest specialty chemicals distributors, just behind IMCD. Two similar companies, but different exposure, balance sheet, and valuation.

• The company is headquartered in Antwerp, Belgium.

• It has a similar geographical exposure as IMCD, being EMEA the largest region representing ~50% of the EBITA.

• Company has a higher leverage than IMCD, being a BB+ company vs. IMCD’s BBB- rating. This is not material, but provides a quick overview of the balance sheet of the company.

I.II History of the Company

Similar to IMCD, Azelis has grown by acquiring dozens of companies. During its past history, it was owned by private equity firm EQT, which then exited through an IPO and subsequent sales.

Company was founded by a man called Dr. Hans Udo Wenzel, a German business executive and entrepreneur in the specialty chemicals and ingredients distribution industry.

• In 1996, he acquired an Italian specialty chemicals distributor called Organa.

• This is often considered as the starting point of Azelis.

• During the next years he continued acquiring small distributors in Italy and created Novorchem.

In 2001, Azelis was created through the merger of Novorchem (Italy) and Arnaud (France), establishing a chemistry-driven specialty distribution platform.

• The company will be headquartered in Antwerp, Belgium.

• Main reasons is that Belgium is major European chemicals hub. Port of Antwerp is one of the biggest chemical ports in the world, and close to Germany, the Netherlands, and France.

• It was also a neutral location for a multinational group.

During the early years (2001–2014) company focused on acquiring European distributors to build critical mass.

• The first acquisition came in 2002 and was in the UK.

• In 2003, Azelis expanded to the DACH region (Germany, Switzerland, and Austria).

• In 2004 company strengthened its operations in the Benelux region and expanded to Spain and Portugal.

• In 2005, the company acquired a Nordic distributor, and will now cover a significant part of Europe.

In 2006, the company was acquired by 3i Group, initiating a series of multiple private equity ownership.

• By that time, IMCD was now owned by a second private equity firm ABN AMRO.

• With 3i Group, the company kept expanding into Europe (the Netherlands, Germany, UK, Turkey, Serbia, etc.), and reorganized all companies under the Azelis brand in 2011.

• Additionally, the company expanded outside Europe. It opened offices in APAC region in 2013, including Shanghai, Beijing, Tokyo, etc., and tackled the US market by acquiring Koda Distribution.

After this expansion, the company expanded its revenues to around €1bn and 3i sold sold the business to Apax Partners in 2015. Under their ownership, the company kept expanding.

• Acquired more companies in Europe, strengthening its operations in Italia, Switzerland, Nordics, etc.

• Additionally, company kept expanding in APAC region (Australia, new HQs in Singapore, etc.), and in the Americas.

Three years later, Apax sold the company to EQT/PSP

• EQT acquired the company through Fund VIII together with PSP Investments.

• Under their leadership, the company completed around 60 acquisitions including the major Vigon International deal, grew revenue from €1.9bn to ~€3bn, and expanded materially in the Americas and APAC

• The pandemic and the subsequent growth fueled by the bottlenecks of 2021, EQT IPOed the company just 3 years after.

In September 2021 it listed on Euronext Brussels at €24/share, raising €880m to partially deleverage to ~2.5×.

• 2022–2023 — Peak performance: Revenue reached ~€4.4bn and adj. EBITA margin peaked at ~12.5%, driven by post-COVID restocking demand and continued M&A. The business refinanced its debt into a bond-and-term-loan structure, but at materially higher rates as the ECB tightened aggressively.

• 2024 — Leadership transition: Anna Bertona succeeded Dr. Hans Joachim Müller as Group CEO on 1 January 2024, after serving as CEO of Azelis EMEA. She is the first internal promotion to the Group CEO role, having joined in 2014 as Chief Strategy & Principal Officer.

• 2025 — Deterioration and stress: Three consecutive years of negative organic revenue growth (driven by customer destocking, tariff uncertainty, and APAC structural pressures) compressed adj. EBITA margin to 10.0% and pushed net profit down 40% to €113m. Net leverage rose to 3.3×, the CFO departed, and the stock has declined -71% since going public.

EQT has gradually sold its stake in Azelis until final exit in 2026.

• This is a normal strategy when a private equity divests through an IPO. EQT couldn’t sell all its 70% stake at once during IPO, as that would put pressure on the share price.

• IPO investors usually impose lock-up agreements to align interests.

• However, the multi-year strategy has taken longer than normal timings and has probably impacted the IRR of the investment.

• EQT Fund VIII is a 2018 vintage — therefore, it needs to return the capital to investors during these years. Company finally exited in February after 7 years invested. This can potentially mean that EQT does not foresee major recovery soon, and/or the sale was part of a planned liquidity strategy.

  • From IPO to February 2025, the fund sold half of its stake at €18-26 per share.

  • Major sell came in November 2025, when the fund sold nearly 20% of the company in a private placement to Temasek and other investors. Following the sale, EQT retained about 10% stake, and was subject to a standard 90-day lock-up period.

  • After the lock-up ended, EQT sold the remaining stake and exited the company.

• In any case this must be taken as a negative development, as the sale from EQT is part of the investment strategy. In fact, having no controlling shareholder can make Azelis a new target for future PE funds.

The group today operates in 63 countries with 4,206 employees, serving 65,000+ customers through 2,800+ principal relationships.

II. Company Analysis

Note: Azelis is a very similar company to IMCD. Given we’ve already covered the business model of IMCD in the prior post, this section will be shorter.

II.I Company Introduction

We already covered during the analysis of IMCD, but it’s important to recall that Azelis addresses 85% of the customers of the principals, representing 20% of the revenue.

• The perfect Pareto rule applies here, where Azelis does what Principals can’t — distributing chemicals in a very fragmented industry.

• It’s highly unlikely that principals try to by-pass companies like Azelis or IMCD as it’s not profitable to focus on smaller clients.

Azelis generates revenue by selling specialty chemicals and food ingredients, enhanced by value-added services

• Value-added services include formulation expertise, regulatory support, warehousing, and marketing. These services improve margins without being separately charged to customers.

The business runs an asset-light model, outsourcing its warehousing and logistics while maintaining strict third-party audits to uphold its standards.

• Capex/revenue is below 1% revenue

• It’s the same model as IMCD which helps the company navigating challenging times like the actual

II.II Key Strengths

Azelis is one of the only two global pure-play specialty chemicals and good ingredients distributors

• Following IMCD, Azelis is currently #2 player worldwide

• Company operates in more than 56 counties, and is the leader in the Americas and holds second place in EMEA, with a growing APAC presence.

Same as IMCD, Azelis provides formulation services

• The company has 70+ laboratories spread across the globe

• While formulation doesn't generate direct revenue, it drives strong customer loyalty and stickiness, since formulations are tied to products only Azelis exclusively distributes.

The business serves 2,800+ principals and 55,000+ customers across life sciences (63% of revenue) and industrial chemicals, with no significant concentration by product, customer, principal, or geography.

II.III Management Team

Azelis operates with a lean five-person executive team; two of those five roles changed hands during 2025 itself, and a third had a significant transition in early 2024 — making this one of the most disrupted management periods in the company’s listed history

• Anna Bertona, CEO — joined 2013, became Group CEO January 2024 (first internal promotion to the role)

• Boris Cambon-Lalanne, CFO — joined January 2026, replacing Thijs Bakker who stepped down after 10 years

• Evy Hellinckx, CEO EMEA — joined 2016, became CEO EMEA in January 2024 (same day as Bertona’s promotion)

• Todd Cottrell, CEO Americas — joined September 2023, external hire from Hempel A/S

• Benoit Fritz, CEO APAC — took over September 2025, replacing Sertaç Sürür who left “for personal reasons”

Same as IMCD, there is a new management team — a new cycle in the chemicals distribution sector is for sure taking place.

• Something surprising is that neither IMCD nor Azelis have profiles entirely focused on strategy and M&A in their executive teams.

• These companies require complex decisions and strategy in order to sustain growth and keep acquiring companies.

• I’m missing some profiles in the Executive Committee focused solely on strategy and having a CFO with more investment banking background.

Bertona has ample experience in the chemicals sector, having spend time in consultancy and other companies

• 30+ years of experience across consumer goods, automotive, and chemicals

• Career before Azelis: partner at A.T. Kearney, focused on chemicals strategy, sales excellence, and post-merger integration

• At Azelis: joined 2013 as Group VP Strategy & Implementation → Chief Strategy & Principal Officer 2014 → CEO EMEA 2016 → Group CEO January 2024

• Education: MSc Industrial Design Engineering, Delft University of Technology; MBA, Rotterdam School of Management

• Total remuneration in 2025: €964,746 (base €784,128 + STI €180,618; no LTIP vested in 2025)

Bakker was the financial architect of Azelis from €90m EBITDA and 7x leverage to a listed company — his departure at a moment of margin compression and 3.3x leverage is the most significant governance event of 2025

• Led the 2021 IPO, all debt refinancings, and approximately 40 M&A transactions

• At the time of the Q3 2025 call, Anna Bertona publicly acknowledged: “When he joined Azelis, we had an EBITDA of €90 million, leverage of almost seven, and a disjointed finance organization”

Boris Cambon-Lalanne, effective January 2026.

• More than 20 years at Solvay, where his most recent role was Capital Markets Director. Prior to that he was Finance Director for Solvay Materials, Finance Director…

• He is an outsider to Azelis — no prior connection to the company or the specialty distribution sector.

• His first public appearance was the FY2025 earnings call in February 2026, where he introduced a formal capital allocation priority framework (EBITDA growth → deleverage → dividend → M&A/buybacks) and confirmed the cost savings programme delivered more than €20m run rate

• Difficult to assess what to expect from him in the long-term, but compared to CFO from IMCD, it might seem more strategic rather than accounting/audit background.

• He has strong challenges ahead.

II.IV Retribution

Similar to IMCD, the retribution system is not fully aligned with the value creation drivers, but has some interesting topics included.

• CEO and CFO earn short-term and long-term bonuses depending on factors such as EBITDA growth, etc.

Short-term criteria are the following:

• 50% of the weight is attributable to Adjusted EBITA, which does not capture organic growth, but rather the EBITA level.

• 20% is gross profit.

• 10% is the net working capital, which is interesting.

• There is 20% attributable to individual performance, and above all, an ESG multiplier between 0.9x to 1.1x.

I consider that these criteria are not fully aligned with shareholder’s interest:

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Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The valuations and analyses presented here are based on publicly available

Please remember that nothing in this post is investment recommendation.

Dear reader,

Today I bring my analysis of IMCD — a leading European company in the specialty chemical distribution.

For this analysis, I will follow again the bullet-point structure to go direct to the point. Please let me know if you enjoy this format or you prefer more text and explanations.

Introduction to IMCD

IMCD is the largest pure specialty chemical distributor in the word, yet it only controls 2% of the market share

• Brentag is the largest distributor of chemicals worldwide, but focused on both specialty and commodity chemicals.

• In the specialty chemicals space, IMCD is the largest company (€4.8bn revenue), followed by Azelis (€4.2bn).

• Despite being the largest company, it only controls ~2% of the market share.

IMCD in a nutshell:

• Company is present in more than 60 countries, being Europe the core geography (xx% of total revenue).

• The firm employs more than 5,000 people around the world, having 118 offices, 153 warehouses and 82 laboratories.

• Company is divided in 8 business groups, which are chemical groups such as beauty, food, construction, etc.

• The company has ~68k customers and trades more than 50k products.

• The company generates €4.8bn in revenues and a FCF of €280m.

Part I: History of the Company

IMCD was founded in 1995 and went public in 2014, growing from a regional distributor into a global specialty chemicals leader through three PE ownership cycles and over 600 acquisitions

IMCD’s origins trace back to 1995, when Piet van der Slikke carved out a group of companies from the Internatio Müller combine division to create a new specialty chemicals distributor:

• In 2001, the company unified its operations on a single IT platform, laying the infrastructure for international growth

• By 2004, Internatio-Müller Chemical Distribution had officially become IMCD as a stand-alone business, with revenues of €550 million and ~700 employees

Three rounds of private equity ownership (2001–2014) defined IMCD’s early growth trajectory, built on both organic expansion and acquisitions:

• Taros Capital & AlpInvest Partners (~2001–2005). Focus was on pan-European expansion beyond the original Benelux and French base

• ABN AMRO Capital (2005–2010). Acquired for ~€300 million. IMCD reached approximately €1 billion in revenue by 2010, driven by acquisitions of smaller specialty chemical distributors across Europe

• Bain Capital & KKR (2010–2014). Acquired at ~€650 million valuation. Continued the acquisition-led expansion strategy ahead of the IPO

IMCD listed on Euronext Amsterdam in June 2014, providing capital to accelerate global expansion:

• IPO priced at €21 per share (today’s share price stands at ~€80), implying a market cap of ~€1 billion

• At IPO, revenue was €1.4 billion and EBITDA margin was ~8%.

Post-IPO growth focused on geographic expansion and building a value-added services platform:

• IMCD expanded into North America and strengthened presence across Latin America and Asia.

• The company built a global network of technical centers, evolving from pure distribution into a formulation and technical advisory partner

The 2020s brought an acceleration in M&A activity, particularly in Asia Pacific:

• In 2021, IMCD accelerated acquisitions across Asia Pacific in personal care, pharmaceuticals, water treatment, and automotive coatings

• 13 acquisitions completed in 2023 alone; opened first “Beauty Studio” in Paris

• 12 further acquisitions completed in 2024, bringing the cumulative total to over 600 since 1995

2024 marked IMCD’s 10-year listing anniversary — but also a significant leadership transition:

• Share price had grown more than 700% since the 2014 IPO

• In January 2024, founder CEO Piet van der Slikke stepped down; replaced by Valerie Diele-Braun

• In April 2025, Diele-Braun stepped down for personal reasons; Marcus Jordan (COO, 26-year IMCD veteran) assumed the CEO role

• Since the founder’s departure, IMCD has lost nearly 45% of market cap — though this is primarily attributable to financial performance and macro headwinds rather than the leadership change itself

Part II: IMCD Business Overview

1. How IMCD Operates

IMCD sits between large global chemical manufacturers and thousands of smaller manufacturing customers, acting as an outsourced sales, marketing and distribution channel that converts suppliers’ fixed distribution costs into variable ones.

What differentiates IMCD from a simple logistics provider is the technical and commercial layer it adds on top of distribution:

• Its sales force includes chemists, pharmacists and formulation experts who advise customers on product selection and ingredient compatibility and a deep network of laboratories across the globe.

• The model is asset-light, with physical warehousing, logistics and transportation fully outsourced:

• IMCD relies on 1,000+ third-party logistics providers for physical distribution

• This drives strong cash conversion and capital returns, as the business requires limited fixed asset investment

Growth is driven by two engines:

• Organic growth: expanding existing supplier relationships into new geographies and product lines

• Acquisitions: exploiting a highly fragmented distribution market where suppliers increasingly want to consolidate around fewer, larger, technically capable partners

IMCD’s scale and network create a compounding competitive advantage:

• 3,000+ principals (suppliers) in its network

• 68,000+ customers across 60+ countries

• The combination of breadth and technical depth makes replication by either suppliers or competitors structurally difficult

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Disclaimer. Please read full disclaimer at the end of the page before reading the article. This publication is only for information and entertainment purposes. It doesn’t constitute financial advice.

Read more

The information provided in this blog is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or professional advice. The …

Read more